Sukkah, Daf Vav, part 3
Introduction
This section analyzes the statement that the laws of "interpositions" are not from the Torah.
חציצין דאורייתא נינהו, דכתיב +ויקרא יד+ ורחץ (את בשרו) במים – שלא יהא דבר חוצץ בינו לבין המים!
But are not [the laws of] interposition from the Torah, as it is written, "And he shall wash his body in water" (Leviticus 14:9) [which implies] that nothing should interpose between him and the water?
The Talmud now turns to the second matter that was claimed to be a "halakhah from Moses at Sinai" was "interpositions." This refers to the notion that if there is something blocking one’s body from direct contact with the waters of the mikveh, the purification is not effective. The Talmud notes that this is implied by a midrash on Leviticus 14:9 one must wash one’s body directly in the water. Nothing may interpose.
כי אתאי הלכתא לשערו, כדרבה בר בר חנה. דאמר רבה בר בר חנא: נימא אחת קשורה – חוצצת, שלש – אינן חוצצות. שתים איני יודע.
The traditional law comes [to teach] concerning one’s hair, in agreement with a statement of Rabbah b. Bar Hana, for Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated: One knotted hair constitutes an interposition, three hairs do not, but I do not know [the law in the case of] two.
The resolution is that the general law of interpositions is indeed from the Torah. But one details of the law is only "derabanan" of rabbinic origin. This is the law concerning how many knotted hairs constitute an interposition. One knotted hair can be tied really tightly, so it does interpose. Three knotted hairs will not be knotted so tightly, so they don’t interpose. Rabbah b. Bar Hana does not know if two knotted hairs interpose or not.
שערו נמי דאורייתא נינהו, דכתיב ורחץ את בשרו במים – את הטפל לבשרו, ומאי ניהו – שערו!
But is not the law relating to one’s hair also from the Torah, since it was written, "And he shall wash [et] his body in water" and [the word] et includes that which is joined to his body. And what is that? His hair.
Through a midrash on the same verse from Leviticus cited above, we now see that the idea that hair interposes is also from the Torah. So we return to our earlier question what part of this law is a "halakhah from Moses at Sinai."
כי אתאי הלכתא – לכדרבי יצחק. דאמר רבי יצחק: דבר תורה, רובו ומקפיד עליו – חוצץ, ושאינו מקפיד עליו – אינו חוצץ. וגזרו על רובו שאינו מקפיד משום רובו המקפיד, ועל מיעוטו המקפיד משום רובו המקפיד.
The tradition comes to teach as did R. Yitzchak; for R. Yitzchak said: From the Torah if it is majority of one’s hair and he does mind it, it interposes but if he doesn’t mind it does not interpose.
But they decreed concerning a case where it is a majority and he doesn’t mind on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind, and [they also decreed] concerning a case where it is a minority and he does mind it on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind.
The Talmud resolves that there are two levels of the law concerning hair interposing in the mikveh. There is a level of interposition that according to Toraitic law disqualifies the immersion. Upon this level the rabbis decreed that other types of interposition disqualify the immersion.
From the Torah two criteria need to be fulfilled for the immersion to be blocked: 1) a majority of his hair must be blocked. 2) He (or she) must "mind" the thing that interposes. What this means is that the thing that is in his hair is something a person would generally not want this to be in his hair. For instance, gum. Other foreign substances (tar, blood etc.) would also not be wanted in one’s hair. Similarly one wouldn’t want one’s hair knotted up.
If only one of these conditions is fulfilled, then the rabbis decreed that it interposes.
If neither of the conditions is fulfilled it doesn’t block the majority of his hair and he doesn’t mind its presence then there is no interposition.
וליגזר נמי על מיעוטו שאינו מקפיד משום מיעוטו המקפיד, אי נמי משום רובו שאינו מקפיד!
היא גופא גזירה, ואנן ניקום וניגזר גזירה לגזירה?
Let us also decree concerning a case where it is not a majority and he doesn’t mind on account of a case where it is not a majority and he does mind, or on account of a case where it is a majority and he doesn’t mind.
This ruling itself is only a rabbinic decree; shall we come and institute a decree lest someone transgress another thing which is only a decree?
The Talmud now asks why we don’t go even a step further. Why not decree that even if he doesn’t mind its presence and it is not on a majority of his hair that it does interpose? In other words, why not just say that anything that interposes blocks the immersion?
The answer is that since only a case where it blocks a majority of the hair and he minds its presence interposes from Torah law, we don’t need to issue a decree lest someone transgress another decree. This is a common principle in rabbinic decrees. They are one degree stricter than Torah law they do not need to be two degrees stricter.