Sukkah, Daf Lamed Aleph, Part 1

 

Introduction

The previous daf dealt with a stolen lulav. This week’s daf begins with a discussion about a stolen sukkah.

 

תנו רבנן: סוכה גזולה, והמסכך ברשות הרבים. רבי אליעזר פוסל, וחכמים מכשירין.

 

Our Rabbis taught: A stolen Sukkah, and one who puts skhakh up in a public thoroughfare: R. Eliezer declares [them] invalid and the sages declare [them] valid.

 

The sugya opens with a baraita in which R. Eliezer and the sages dispute the validity of a stolen sukkah and one built in the public domain, R. Eliezer invalidating it and the sages validating it.

אמר רב נחמן: מחלוקת בשתוקף את חבירו והוציאו מסוכתו.

ורבי אליעזר לטעמיה, דאמר: אין אדם יוצא ידי חובתו בסוכתו של חבירו.

אי קרקע נגזלת – סוכה גזולה היא, ואי נמי קרקע אינה נגזלת – סוכה שאולה היא.

 

R. Nahman explained: There is a dispute only where he forcibly ejects his fellow from the Sukkah.

And R. Eliezer is consistent with his view, for he said, "One cannot fulfil his obligation in another person’s sukkah."

If [we hold that] land [transfer can be effected] by robbery, the sukkah is a stolen one, and even if [we hold that] land [transfer] cannot be [effected by] robbery the Sukkah is a borrowed one.

 

The amora R. Nahman now begins to explain the underpinnings of the dispute between R. Nahman and the sages. In order to understand this we need to understand that there is a dispute concerning whether when one "robs" someone of his land, does legal title change hands. If title does change hands, then when Shimon robs Reuben of his land, the land now belongs to Shimon. Of course he must restore the land to Reuben, but until he does so, it is his land. If something happens to the land (such as a river flooding it) he must restore the original value of the land to the one from whom he stole it.

R. Nahman interprets R. Eliezer’s opinion so that we don t need to know whether R. Eliezer holds that land can or cannot be stolen. R. Eliezer holds that one must own his own sukkah. So if land can be stolen, then the sukkah is a stolen one and cannot be used because it doesn’t belong to him. If land cannot be stolen then it is still a borrowed sukkah and one can’t use a borrowed sukkah either.

 

ורבנן לטעמייהו, דאמרי: אדם יוצא ידי חובתו בסוכתו של חבירו. וקרקע אינה נגזלת, וסוכה שאולה היא.

 

And the rabbis are also consistent with their own view, for they say that a man can fulfill his obligation with another person’s sukkah.

And land [transfer] cannot be [effected by] robbery, so the Sukkah is a borrowed one.

 

The rabbis hold that one can use another person’s sukkah in order to fulfill his obligation. They also hold that land cannot be stolen, so this is considered a borrowed sukkah, which one can use to fulfill one’s obligation.

 

 

אבל גזל עצים וסיכך בהן – דברי הכל אין לו אלא דמי עצים. ממאי – מדקתני דומיא דרשות הרבים, מה רשות הרבים קרקע לאו דידיה הוא – סוכה נמי לאו קרקע דידיה הוא.

 

But if he stole wood and used it for skhakh, all agree that he [the owner] has [a claim] merely against the cost of the wood.

How [do we know this]? Since they taught this together [with a sukkah built] in the public thoroughfare; just as the ground of a public thoroughfare is not his, so the sukkah is also put up on land that is not his.

 

R. Nahman limited the dispute between the rabbis and R. Eliezer to a case where he stole the land itself meaning he built the entire sukkah on land that is not his. The reason that R. Nahman interpreted the mishnah this way is that the "stolen sukkah" is compared in the baraita to one who builds a sukkah in the public thoroughfare. In both cases one is using land that doesn’t belong to him.

The sages and R. Eliezer do not dispute if one steals wood and uses it to build a sukkah. In such a case all agree that the sukkah can be used for the festival. The thief just owes the wood back to the one from whom he stole it. But in the meanwhile, the sukkah is his and he can use it to fulfill his obligation.