Avodah Zarah, Daf Mem Zayin, Part 1

 

Introduction

Today s section continues the discussion about cases where something was worshipped as an idol but since it was attached to the ground, the object did not become prohibited. Can parts of that object be used in the Temple service?

 

בעי ר"ל המשתחוה לדקל לולבו מהו למצוה? באילן שנטעו מתחלה לכך לא תיבעי לך דאפילו להדיוט נמי אסור כי תיבעי לך באילן שנטעו ולבסוף עבדו ואליבא דרבי יוסי בר יהודה לא תיבעי לך דאפי’ להדיוט נמי אסור כי תיבעי לך אליבא דרבנן לענין מצוה מאי מי מאיס כלפי גבוה או לא?

 

R. Shimon b. Lakish asked: If one worshipped a palm-tree, may its lulav be used for the fulfilment of the mitzvah? If it was a tree originally planted for idolatry the question does not arise, because it is prohibited even for secular use; but the question does arise with a tree which had been planted and subsequently worshipped. Now according to the view of R. Yose son of R. Judah, [even then] the question does not arise because it is prohibited by him even for secular use; but the question does arise according to the view of the rabbis. Is [this lulav] revolting for holy use or not.

 

The particular issue arises if the tree was not planted for the sake of idolatry and then was worshipped. If it was planted for the sake of idolatry, it is forbidden even for secular use. Furthermore, it is only a question for those rabbis who hold that in such cases the tree is permitted for secular use. While the branches and fruit could be used for non-religious purposes can the lulav be used for the mitzvah on Sukkot?

 

כי אתא רב דימי אמר באשירה שביטלה קמבעיא ליה יש דחוי אצל מצות או אין דחוי אצל מצות

 

When R. Dimi came he said: The question was asked in connection with an Asherah which had been annulled. Is there such a concept as disqualified with regard to commandments or not?

 

R. Dimi says that the question was asked with regard to an asherah, a tree that had been planted to be worshipped that was then annulled. The concept of disqualification is that once an object has been disqualified it cannot go back and become qualified again. If we apply this concept to the lulav, then since the lulav could not have been used when the tree was still an asherah, it cannot be used later when the tree is no longer an asherah.

 

תפשוט ליה מדתנן כיסהו ונתגלה פטור מלכסות כיסהו הרוח חייב לכסות

ואמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן לא שנו אלא שחזר ונתגלה אבל לא חזר ונתגלה פטור מלכסות

והוינן בה כי חזר ונתגלה מאי הוי הואיל ואידחי אידחי

וא"ר פפא זאת אומרת אין דיחוי אצל מצות

 

You can solve this problem from what we have learned: If one covered it [blood of a wild animal or bird that had been slaughtered], and it became uncovered, he is exempt from having to cover it again; but if the wind covered it, he is obligated to cover it himself. And Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Yohanan: This was taught only when the wind again uncovered it, but if the wind did not again uncover it, he is exempt from having to cover it.

And we raised the question: If the wind again uncovered it, so what? Since [the blood] has been disqualified from the obligation [of covering], it is disqualified [once for all]!

And R. Papa said: This proves that there is no concept of disqualification with regard to commandments.

 

The Talmud tries to solve the question by looking at another sugya in which the concept of disqualification appears. The blood of a wild animal (deer) or bird that has been slaughtered must be covered. If one covered it up and then it became uncovered, since he has fulfilled the mitzvah, he need not do it over again. If the wind covered it, and then again uncovered it, he must cover it. But if the wind covered it and it remains covered, he need not perform mitzvah.

The Talmud then analyzes the concept behind this last law. If the wind covered it then the mitzvah was fulfilled. So why should it matter if the wind again uncovers it. Once the mitzvah has been fulfilled, it should not need to be fulfilled again. This seems to prove that there is no concept of disqualification with regard to mitzvot. Even though the mitzvah was fulfilled, in a sense disqualified from needing to be fulfilled, it needs to be fulfilled again.

 

דרב פפא גופיה איבעיא ליה מפשט פשיטא ליה לרב פפא דאין דיחוי אצל מצות לא שנא לקולא ולא שנא לחומרא או דלמא ספוקי מספקא ליה ולחומרא אמרינן לקולא לא אמרינן תיקו

 

The question was asked in connection with this very statement of R. Papa itself. Is it clear to R. Papa that there is no disqualification with regard to commandments either to create a leniency or a stringency; or perhaps he is doubtful and we apply the concept when it leads to a stringency but not to a leniency. The question remains unanswered.

 

The answer is provided by noticing the difference between cases where this concept leads to a leniency and cases where it leads to a stringency. In the case of the blood, it would lead to a leniency if the wind covered and then uncovered the blood, the notion of disqualification would lead us to conclude that the blood need not be covered again. Since it would lead to a leniency R. Papa did not invoke it. But maybe he would invoke the principle in the case of the lulav, for there it would lead to a stringency once the tree was worshipped its branches cannot be used, even if the tree was annulled as an idol. Or maybe he would never invoke the principle, no matter the results.

Since we don t know whether R. Papa did invoke the principle to lead to a stringency, the question had to be asked.

But, as often is the case, there is no answer.