Avodah Zarah, Daf Mem Vav, Part 5

 

Introduction

Yesterday s section began a discussion between Rava and R. Huna concerning using the case of the hire of a harlot to answer a question with regard to stones that were detached from a mountain that was worshipped. Can such stones be used to build the altar?

Rava used a kal vehomer argument as grounds for a stringency, whereas R. Huna used them as grounds for a leniency. This is where our sugya picks up.

 

א"ל אנא קאמינא לחומרא ואת אמרת לקולא קולא וחומרא לחומרא פרכינן

[Rava] replied to [R. Huna]: I reason from the lenient to the strict view and you reason from the strict to the lenient view; and the rule is that where it is possible to reason to both conclusions we argue to the strict view.

 

Rava states here a rule of thumb. When arguments can be made in both ways, one leading to a stringency and one to a leniency, the argument should be made towards stringency.

א"ל רב פפא לרבא וכל היכא דאיכא קולא וחומרא לקולא לא פרכינן והא הזאה דפסח דפליגי ר’ אליעזר ור"ע דר’ אליעזר סבר לחומרא וקא מחייב ליה לגברא ור"ע לקולא ופטר וקא פריך ר"ע לקולא דתנן השיב ר"ע או חילוף ומה הזאה שהיא משום שבות אינה דוחה השבת שחיטה שהיא דאורייתא לא כ"ש

 

R. Papa said to Rava: But is it true that where it is possible to reason to both a lenient and a stringent position, we do not reason to a lenient position? Behold there is the example of the sprinkling on Pesah over which R. Eliezer and R. Akiva dispute; for R. Eliezer holds the strict view and makes the man liable [to bring the pesach sacrifice] and R. Akiva holds the lenient view and exempts him. And R. Akiva argues for the lenient conclusion; as it was taught: R. Akiva responded: Rather conclude the reverse: if sprinkling which is only [forbidden on Shabbat] due to shevut does not supersede Shabbat, how much more must the act of slaughtering [the pesach lamb which is prohibited] by the Torah not [supersede Shabbat]!

 

R. Papa locates a case in Mishnah Pesachim 6:2 where R. Eliezer and R. Akiva argue and still R. Akiva uses logic to arrive at a lenient view. The issue is whether one is allowed to sprinkle the ashes of the red heifer on someone on Shabbat in order to purify him so that he may bring the pesah sacrifice. R. Eliezer is strict (in a sense) and allows the sprinkling and thereby makes him liable to bring the pesah. R. Akiva is lenient and exempts him, and offers an inference to back up his leniency.

For a full interpretation of this mishnah see my commentary in Mishnah Yomit on Pesahim 6:2.

 

התם ר’ אליעזר גמריה ואייקר ליה תלמודא ואתא ר"ע לאדכוריה והיינו דא"ל רבי אל תכפירני בשעת הדין כך מקובל אני ממך הזאה שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת

 

In that case R. Eliezer had himself taught him, but had forgotten his own teaching; so R. Akiva came and reminded him of it. That is why [R. Akiba] said to him, My master! Do not deny me in the time of judgment! Thus have I received the teaching from you: Sprinkling [is prohibited] on account of shevut and it does not supersede Shabbat.

 

The Talmud says that R. Akiva did not really come to this leniency by a midrashic inference. Rather, it was a tradition that R. Eliezer had taught him, but R. Eliezer forgot the teaching. His midrash was merely meant to remind R. Eliezer of his tradition. It was not formative.