Avodah Zarah, Daf Mem Tet, Part 2

 

Introduction

Yesterday s section referred to a case where a field was fertilized with the product of idolatry or a cow fattened with the product of idolatry. It was suggested the R. Eliezer was stringent and the rabbis were lenient. Thus R. Eliezer holds that when there are two causes, the product is prohibited and the rabbis hold the product is permitted. The Talmud now searches for the source of this dispute.

 

הי ר"א ורבנן אילימא ר"א ורבנן דשאור דתנן שאור של חולין ושל תרומה שנפלו לתוך העיסה לא בזה כדי לחמץ ולא בזה כדי לחמץ ונצטרפו וחימצו ר"א אומר אחר האחרון אני בא וחכ"א בין שנפל איסור לכתחלה ובין שנפל איסור לבסוף אינו אסור עד שיהא בו כדי לחמץ

ואמר אביי לא שנו אלא שקדם וסילק את האיסור אבל לא קדם וסילק את האיסור אסור

 

Which R. Eliezer and rabbis? If I say it is [the dispute] between them with regard to leaven, for we have taught: Ordinary leaven and terumah leaven which fell into dough, and in each there was an insufficient quantity to cause leavening, but together they caused leavening: R. Eliezer says: I follow whichever [leaven went into the dough] last. But the sages say: Whether the prohibited leaven fell in first or last, [the dough] is not prohibited unless it is of a sufficient quantity by itself to cause fermentation.

And Abaye explained: The teaching [of R. Eliezer] only applies when he first removed the prohibited leaven but if he did not first remove the prohibited leaven, [the dough] is prohibited.

 

R. Eliezer and the rabbis disagree over a case where two pieces of leaven (starter dough) fall into a batch of dough and cause the dough to rise (neither was sufficient in and of itself). One of these pieces is terumah and can be eaten only by priests, and one is non-sacred and can be eaten by anyone. According to R. Eliezer, the status of the dough follows whatever the last piece of leaven was, because this is the leaven that causes fermentation. Abaye adds that if the forbidden leaven was left in there, then in all cases the dough is prohibited. Thus R. Eliezer seems to hold that in cases with two causes, one permitted and one prohibited, the result is prohibited. The rabbis would be lenient. This seems to locate the dispute between the two baraitot in yesterday s section.

 

וממאי דטעמא דר"א כדאביי דלמא טעמא דר"א משום דאחר אחרון אני בא אי גמיר באיסורא אסורה ואי גמיר בהיתירא מותרין בין סלקיה ובין לא סלקיה

 

But how do we know that the reasoning of R. Eliezer is like that suggested by Abaye; perhaps his reasoning is because he follows the last thing, and thus if the last thing was forbidden, it is forbidden, and if the last thing is permitted, it is permitted, whether he removed [the prohibited substance] or did not.

 

The problem with the above suggestion is that it depends on Abaye s explanation of R. Eliezer. Abaye is the one who implied that in cases of two causes R. Eliezer prohibits. Abaye s explanation allows us to pair R. Eliezer and the sages dispute with the two baraitot concerning the field fertilized with idolatry or cow fed with idolatry. But the simple reading of R. Eliezer is that the ruling depends on which substance is put in last. If the permitted leaven was put in last, R. Eliezer may permit the dough even though the forbidden dough was still present. In other words, R. Eliezer may not hold that in all cases of two causes the result is prohibited. He may hold that the principle is that we simply follow whatever was put in last.