Avodah Zarah, Daf Kaf Gimmel, Part 1
Introduction
The mishnah prohibited allowing one to let non-Jews be alone with one s animals out of fear of bestiality. In contrast, the baraita allowed one to buy animals from non-Jews for sacrifices, and did not seem worried about bestiality. Ravina offers a different solution for this contradiction.
רבינא אמר לא קשיא הא לכתחלה הא דיעבד.
Ravina said: There is no contradiction; the one teaching [prohibits it] ab initio; the other [permits it] ex post facto.
Ravina solves the contradiction by distinguishing between the ab initio law and the ex post facto law. Ab initio one should not leave non-Jews alone with animals. Ex post facto if they were left alone, we are not concerned lest they engaged in bestiality with the animal. Therefore we can buy the animal and use it for a sacrifice.
ומנא תימרא דשאני בין לכתחלה בין לדיעבד? דתנן לא תתייחד אשה עמהם מפני שחשודין על העריות ורמינהו האשה שנחבשה בידי עובדי כוכבים ע"י ממון מותרת לבעלה ע"י נפשות אסורה לבעלה
אלא לאו ש"מ שאני לן בין לכתחלה לדיעבד
And from where do we know that a difference is made between ab initio and ex post facto? From the following: We have learned: A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of fornication; and against this they cast the following: A woman who had been imprisoned by non-Jews in connection with monetary matters, is permissible to her husband, but if on a capital charge, she is forbidden to her husband.
Does this not prove that we differentiate between ab initio and ex post facto?
The Talmud tries to use two seemingly contradictory mishnayot to demonstrate that there is a difference between ab initio, when we are not concerned for sexual misconduct, and ex post facto, where we are not concerned. Ab initio a woman should not be alone with non-Jews we fear that they will rape her But ex post facto, if she was alone with them because she was imprisoned for monetary matters, then she is still permitted to her husband. We are not concerned that she willingly had sex with them (which would cause her to be prohibited to her husband, even if he is not a priest).
ממאי דלמא לעולם אימא לך אפילו דיעבד נמי לא והכא היינו טעמא דמתיירא משום הפסד ממונו.
תדע דקתני סיפא ע"י נפשות אסורה לבעלה ותו לא מידי
But how would you know this! Perhaps I could say to you that the prohibition applies even after it happened, but here the reason is that the non-Jew will be afraid to lose his money! You can indeed prove it by what is stated in the second clause: If on a capital charge, she is forbidden to her husband. So there is no more [to be said about this].
The Talmud rejects the broad conclusion that ex post facto we are not concerned with sexual sin (bestiality or fornication). The reason why the imprisoned woman is permitted to her husband is not that this is an ex post facto question. Rather, she is permitted because the non-Jew will fear raping her lest this causes him to lose his money (the husband would not want to pay to have her redeemed, I know this is awful). This can be shown from the end of that mishnah, which teaches that if she was taken prisoner for a capital charge, she may not return to her husband. Thus the distinction is rejected.
