Avodah Zarah, Daf Zayin, Part 1
Introduction
This section relates to the prohibition in the mishnah of recovering debts from idolaters during the three days prior to their festivals.
מתניתין דלא כר’ יהושע בן קרחה דתניא ריב"ק אומר מלוה בשטר אין נפרעין מהן מלוה על פה נפרעין מהן מפני שהוא כמציל מידם
Our mishnah does not accord with [the opinion of] R. Joshua b. Korha. For it is taught: R. Joshua b. Korha says: One may not recover a loan made through a document, but one may collect a loan made by word of mouth, since this is as if he is rescuing it from their hands.
R. Joshua b. Korha allows one to recover a debt made orally because such debts are generally hard to recover. We can see here that preventing the idolater from celebrating on his festival is not the primary consideration for R. Joshua b. Korha.
יתיב רב יוסף אחוריה דר’ אבא ויתיב רבי אבא קמיה דרב הונא ויתיב וקאמר הלכתא כרבי יהושע בן קרחה והלכתא כר’ יהודה הלכתא כרבי יהושע הא דאמרן.
R. Joseph was sitting behind R. Abba while R. Abba was sitting in front of R. Huna who, as he was sitting stated: [In one instance] the halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha and [in another] the halakhah follows R. Judah. The halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha in the one about which we have just spoken.
Here we can see some live action in the amoraic academy. Note the precision of the seating arrangements. R. Abba sits in front of R. Huna, the master, and recites traditions in front of him. R. Joseph is also present, and from what we can see below, is also in a position of authority. R. Abba, the student, recites two pithy halakhic rulings that seem to have nothing to do with one another. The Talmud is now left to figure out the meaning of these two rulings.
The ruling according to R. Joshua b. Korha is with regard to the matter at hand.
כר’ יהודה דתניא הנותן צמר לצבע לצבוע לו אדום וצבעו שחור שחור וצבעו אדום
ר"מ אומר נותן לו דמי צמרו
רבי יהודה אומר אם השבח יתר על היציאה נותן לו את היציאה ואם היציאה יתירה על השבח נותן לו את השבח.
According to R. Judah: This refers to what we learned: If one gives wool to a dyer to be dyed red and he dyed it black, or to be dyed black and he dyed it red:
R. Meir says: The dyer should refund to the owner the value of his wool.
R. Judah says: If the increase in value [through the dyeing] exceeds the costs, the owner may pay the costs, or if the costs exceed the increased value, he may pay the increase in value.
According to R. Meir, if the dyer dyes the wool the wrong color, the wool is now his and he must pay back the value of the undyed wool to the original owner.
R. Judah says that the owner must pay the lower of two values to the dyer: the cost of dyeing the wool (cost of dye and wood to heat the cauldron to cook the dye) or the increase in value of the wool. This way the original owner cannot lose out, but the dyer still might recover his costs. The halakhah, according to R. Abba, follows R. Judah.
אהדרינהו רב יוסף לאפיה: בשלמא הלכה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה איצטריך ס"ד אמינא יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים קא משמע לן הלכה כיחיד. אלא הלכה כרבי יהודה למה לי פשיטא דמחלוקת ואחר כך סתם הלכתא כסתם.
R. Joseph turned his face away from R. Abba [and said]: It made sense [to state] that the halakhah is according to R. Joshua b. Karha for we might have said that where an individual disagrees with a majority, the halakhah is according to the majority, so he teaches us that here the halakhah is according to the individual.
But why state that the law is according to R. Judah? It is obvious that where differing opinions [are quoted] and then [one of these] is quoted anonymously, the law is according to the anonymous opinion.
R. Joseph is angry at R. Abba, not because he said something wrong, but because he said something overly obvious. It was not obvious that the halakhah follows R. Joshua b. Korha, because his was a minority opinion. But it should be obvious that the halakhah follows R. Judah because of a different principle. If the mishnah quotes a dispute and then later quotes one of those opinions anonymously, the halakhah follows the anonymous opinion. The idea is that when composing the Mishnah, R. Judah Hanasi hinted at his own opinion by citing the anonymous voice, with which he agreed, last. As we shall see, this is one of those cases.
מחלוקת בבבא קמא וסתם בבבא מציעא דתנן כל המשנה ידו על התחתונה וכל החוזר בו ידו על התחתונה
The differing opinions are quoted in Bava Kamma, and the anonymous opinion is in Bava Metzia, where it is taught: The party which changes [an agreement] has the lesser right, and whoever retracts has the lesser right.
The dispute between R. Judah and R. Meir was found in Bava Kamma. In Bava Metzia a mishnah teaches that whoever changes the agreement, such as a dyer who dyes the wrong color, has the lesser right. He can claim either the costs or the increased value, whichever is less. This is the same as R. Judah s opinion.
ורב הונא? משום דאין סדר למשנה, דאיכא למימר סתם תנא ברישא ואחר כך מחלוקת.
And as to R. Huna? [His statement is necessary] because there may be no order to the Mishnah, so that it could be said that the anonymous statement was quoted earlier and the differing opinions later.
R. Huna (who did not rebuke R. Abba) could respond that there is no order to the Mishnah. Perhaps the anonymous statement was issued first.
אי הכי כל מחלוקת ואחר כך סתם לימא אין סדר למשנה? ורב הונא כי לא אמרינן אין סדר בחדא מסכת’ בתרי מסכתי אמרינן.
But if that were so, every case of differing opinions followed by an anonymous one, we could say there is no order to the Mishnah! R. Huna [could reply]: When we do not say that there is no order to the Mishnah, that is within one tractate, but in two tractates we do say there is no order.
R. Huna here clarifies his opinion. There is indeed order within a tractate, but there is no order between different tractates. Thus, if there is a dispute in Bava Kamma and an anonymous opinion in Bava Metzia, the halakhah does not necessarily follow the opinion in Bava Metzia.
ורב יוסף כולה נזיקין חדא מסכת’ היא
ואי בעית אימא משום דקתני לה גבי הלכתא פסיקתא כל המשנה ידו על התחתונה וכל החוזר בו ידו על התחתונה
And as to R. Joseph? He holds that all of Nezikin is one tractate;
Or, if you want, you can say, because this rule was taught among legal and fixed decisions, thus: The party which changes [an agreement] has the lesser right, and whoever retracts has the lesser right.
R. Joseph responds that this is not a case of two tractates. Nezikin (Bava Kamma, Metzia and Batra) is one tractate, that later in its development was divided into three.
Alternatively, he could justify his opinion by saying that the anonymous opinion in this case has more authority because it was quoted among legal and fixed decisions. These are a set of rules that are taught in a pithy and apodictic manner. These mishnayot are not the typical case law they are rules.