Sukkah, Daf Mem Bet, Part 2

 

Introduction

Today’s section deals with the notion found in R. Yose’s halakhah that if one accidentally sins while trying to perform a mitzvah he is exempt from bringing a sin offering for his transgression.

 

אמר רב הונא: אומר היה רבי יוסי עולת העוף שנמצאת בין אגפיים, וכסבור חטאת העוף היא ואכלה – פטור.

 

R. Huna said: R. Yose used to say: A bird [offered as] a burnt-offering that was found among other fowls and [the priest] thought that it was a bird sin-offering, and ate it, he is exempt.

 

R. Huna, an amora, quotes another saying by R. Yose. A priest found a bird that really should have been a burnt offering, meaning it should have been completely burned on the altar, but he ate it thinking it was a sin offering, which a priest is allowed to eat. R. Yose rules that he is exempt and need not bring a sin offering to atone for his sin.

מאי קא משמע לן – דטעה בדבר מצוה פטור, היינו הך!

מהו דתימא: התם הוא דטעה בדבר מצוה פטור – היינו דעבד מצוה, אבל הכא דטעה בדבר מצוה ולא עבד מצוה – אימא לא, קא משמע לן.

 

What does he teach us by this ruling? That one who errs in connection with a mitzvah is exempt? But this is the same [as the Mishnah]?

What might you have thought? There [in the mishnah] he is not liable when he errs in connection with a mitzvah, because he performs a mitzvah, but here where he erred in connection with a mitzvah but he does not perform another mitzvah, I might have said that he is liable, therefore he informs us [that even here he is exempt].

 

The Talmud explains why R. Yose needed to make this statement above, even after he had already made his statement in the mishnah. We might have thought that he was exempt for carrying the lulav out into the public domain because although he was transgressing the laws of Shabbat, he was also fulfilling the mitzvah of lulav. But here, in the case of the bird sacrifice, he is not fulfilling a mitzvah. There is no mitzvah for him to eat this sacrifice. Therefore, we might have thought that he should be liable for his transgression. That is why R. Yose had to teach us that even in this case he is exempt because he thought he was performing a mitzvah.

 

מיתיבי, רבי יוסי אומר: השוחט את התמיד שאינו מבוקר כהלכתו בשבת – חייב חטאת, וצריך תמיד אחר! –

 

They objected: R. Yose says: One who slaughters a daily offering which has not been properly examined on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering and another daily offering must be offered.

 

The Talmud now brings an objection to this broad interpretation of R. Yose’s principle. The person in this baraita wanted to slaughter a daily offering (tamid) on Shabbat, an act which is allowed. But he slaughtered one whose validity had not been examined, which means the animal cannot be used as a tamid. This is a transgression of the laws of Shabbat for which R. Yose says he must bring a sin offering. Thus we see that R. Yose doesn’t hold that if someone errs while performing a mitzvah he is always exempt from bringing a sin-offering.

 

 

אמר ליה: בר מינה דההיא. דהא אתמר עלה, אמר רב שמואל בר חתאי אמר רב המנונא סבא אמר רב יצחק בר אשיאן אמר רב הונא אמר רב: כגון שהביאו מלשכה שאינן מבוקרין.

 

The other answered him: That case is different, for it has been said concerning it: R. Shmuel bar Hattai said in the name of R. Hamnuna Saba who said in the name of R. Isaac b. Ashian who said in the name of R. Huna who said in the name of Rav: For instance they brought it from a chamber that contained animals which had not been examined.

 

The Talmud now explains why that case is different and not demonstrative of R. Yose’s general rule. In this case they brought the animal from the wrong chamber. This was closer to negligence than a simple mistake, and therefore he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his transgression. But in cases like the lulav where he simply made a mistake, he is not liable for a sin-offering.