Sukkah, Daf Lammed Gimmel, Part 5
Introduction
The mishnah states that one is not allowed to reduce the invalid berries on Yom Tov (the festival). The sugya continues to discuss the issue of "set aside" in light of this mishnah.
ואין ממעטין ביום טוב. הא עבר ולקטן מאי – כשר, דאשחור אימת? אילימא דאשחור מאתמול – דחוי מעיקרא הוא, תפשוט מינה דחוי מעיקרא דלא הוי דחוי!
אלא לאו – דאשחור ביום טוב, נראה ונדחה הוא, שמעת מינה נראה ונדחה חוזר ונראה! –
But one may not reduce them [the berries] on Yom Tov.
But if he transgressed and did pluck them it is valid.
But then, when did it become black?
If you will say that it became black from the previous day, then it is a case of "set aside" from the very outset. Deduce from here that something that is "set aside" from the very outset is not [permanently] set aside?
Rather it became black on the Festival. It is thus a case of being fit and then "set aside". Deduce from here that if something was fit and then was "set aside" it may become fit again?
The mishnah teaches that one shouldn’t reduce the number of berries on Yom Tov. The reason why will be explained below. However, the mishnah doesn’t say that if he reduces the number of berries on Yom Tov it is invalid. The implication is that this is something one shouldn’t do, but that if one does it, it is valid.
So now the question becomes when did the berries turn black (only black berries are invalid)? If they turned black before the festival began then this is a case of "set aside from the outset." The hadas was invalid when the festival began. So why then didn’t we use this mishnah to derive the question about this that we asked earlier?
But if it became black on the festival outside, then we have a slightly different case. The hadas was fit when Yom Tov began, then it became unfit when the berries turned black, and then it became fit again when he removed the berries. Based on this assumption we could deduce that in all such cases, when something is fit and then set aside, it can become fit again. But evidently the Talmud does not want to make such an assumption.
לא, לעולם דאשחור מעיקרא, דחוי מעיקרא דלא הוי דחוי – תפשוט מינה, אבל נראה ונדחה חוזר ונראה – לא תפשוט.
No! Indeed it refers to a case where it became black from the outset; and you can deduce from here that something "set aside" from the outset is not permanently "set aside"; But a case in which it was fit and then was "set aside" you cannot deduce from here.
The Talmud returns to option one from above. The hadas’s berries were black before Yom Tov began. It was "set aside" from the outset but then became valid when he picked them off. From here we can deduce that indeed, in general, if something is "set aside" from the outset it can still become valid at a later point. But we still don’t know what the rule is if something is at first fit and then become set aside (the berries were green and then became black). Can it become fit again? This question is not answered in our sugya. Sometimes the Talmud just prefers to leave matters unanswered.
תנו רבנן: אין ממעטין ביום טוב, משום רבי אליעזר ברבי שמעון אמרו: ממעטין. – והא קא מתקן מנא ביום טוב! – אמר רב אשי: כגון שלקטן לאכילה, ורבי אליעזר ברבי שמעון סבר לה כאבוה, דאמר: דבר שאין מתכוין מותר –
Our Rabbis taught: One may not reduce [the number of berries] on the Festival. In the name of R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon they said that one may reduce.
But is he not fixing an object on the Festival?
R. Ashi said: This is a case where he plucked them for food, and R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon holds the same opinion as his father who said that a work which is done without intention is permitted.
In this baraita we see a dispute over whether one can reduce the berries on the hadas on Yom Tov. The majority opinion holds that one cannot, for this is considered "fixing an object" which is forbidden on Shabbat and on a festival. However, R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon does allow one to do so.
The Talmud is perplexed by R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon’s opinion it seems to be a blatant violation of Shabbat.
R. Ashi answers that R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon allows ond to pick the berries off of the hadas only if he does so to eat them. In such a case his intent was not to "fix the object" but to get food, which one is allowed to do on Yom Tov. Therefore, this tanna holds like his father, R. Shimon, that if one intends to do something that is permitted and he at the same time does something forbidden, the action is allowed.
והא אביי ורבא דאמרי תרוייהו: מודה רבי שמעון בפסיק רישיה ולא ימות! – הכא במאי עסקינן דאית ליה הושענא אחריתי.
But do not both Abaye and Raba say that R. Shimon admits in the case of "If his head is cut off will he not die" [that it is forbidden]?
Here we are dealing with a case where he has another hoshanna.
However, a problem remains Abaye and Rava both hold that if you intend to do X action which is permitted but Y will certainly happen, then the action is still prohibited, even though performing Y wasn’t his intention. The case they refer to is where one wants to cut the head off a bird so his kid can play with it (thank God for Legos!). One can argue that his intention is not to kill the bird, an action that is forbidden on Shabbat, but to get a toy for his kid, which is not inherently prohibited. However, since we know the bird will die when he takes off its head to be a toy the action is still prohibited. So too, picking the berries for food is prohibited because he knows that by doing so will validate the hadas.
The Talmud answers that this is the case where he has another "hoshanna" the Aramaic word for hadas. It is clear that he is picking the berries for food because he doesn’t need this hadas to perform his mitzvah. Therefore, the hadas is valid if he or someone else should subsequently decide to use it.