Sukkah, Daf Yod Gimmel, Part 6
Introduction
Today’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section concerning one who cuts down grain to use it for skhakh. Do the stalks, the parts of the grain that holds the kernels to the rest of the plant become susceptible to impurity? Yesterday, we saw a baraita which had a tannaitic dispute on this issue. The Talmud said that R. Abba, who said that they are not susceptible to impurity, agreed with one side of this tannaitic dispute.
לרבי אבא – ודאי תנאי היא, לרב מנשיא בר גדא מי לימא תנאי היא?
To R. Abba this is certainly a tannaitic dispute. But shall we say that it is also a tannaitic dispute according to R. Menashye bar Gada?
R. Abba had said that one who harvests grapes for wine does not render the stalks susceptible to impurity, but that one who harvests grain for skhakh does render them susceptible. R. Abba must admit that he follows one side in the tannaitic dispute found at the end of yesterday’s section, namely the opinion of "others" who said that produce used as skhakh does have the rule of handles meaning the handles used to hold the produce have the status of produce. Harvesting grapes does not render the handles susceptible because he actively does not want them there.
The question is can we interpret R. Menashye, who said that the handles are not susceptible to impurity when harvested for skhakh, such that he can agree with both sides of the tannaitic dispute.
אמר לך רב מנשיא: דכולי עלמא סברי: הקוצר לסכך אין לו ידות, והכא במאי עסקינן – כגון שקוצצן לאכילה, ונמלך עליהן לסיכוך.
R. Menashye can answer you: All agree that he who harvests grain for skhakh does not render the handles susceptible to uncleanliness, but here we are dealing with a particular case where he harvests them for food, and then changed his mind [and used them] for skhakh.
R. Menashye could answer that both tannaim, the first opinion and the "others," agree that when one harvests produce to use for skhakh he does not render the handles susceptible to impurity. The baraita, where the "others" seem to hold that he does render the handles susceptible, refers to a case where a person originally harvested the grain for food and then changed his mind and wanted to use them for skhakh. Once he harvested them for food he rendered the "handles" susceptible to impurity. The "others" hold that they remain susceptible even afterwards when he decides to use them for skhakh.
אי קוצצן לאכילה מאי טעמייהו דרבנן?
וכי תימא קסברי רבנן: כיון דנמלך עליהן לסיכוך בטלה ליה מחשבתו, ומי בטלה ליה מחשבה בהכי?
But if he cut them for food, what is the reason [for the view] of the rabbis? And if you will answer that the rabbis are of the opinion that since he changed his mind about them [to use them] for skhakh, his original intention becomes annulled, [it may be objected], does then one’s intention become annulled in such a case?
The Talmud now asks why the rabbis (the first opinion in the baraita) would hold that if he harvested them originally for food the handles are not susceptible to impurity, even after he changed his mind to use them for skhakh. As we shall see in the mishnah that follows once something is susceptible to impurity, simply changing one’s mind about it cannot stop it being susceptible to impurity.
והתנן: כל הכלים יורדין לידי טומאה במחשבה, ואין עולין מטומאתן אלא בשינוי מעשה. מעשה מוציא מיד מעשה ומיד מחשבה, מחשבה אינה מוציאה לא מיד מעשה ולא מיד מחשבה.
Have we not learned: All vessels can be rendered susceptible to uncleanliness by intention, but cannot be rendered insusceptible except by an act of change, since an act can annul a [prior] act or intention, while an intention cannot annul either a [previous] act or a [previous] intention.
Mishnah Kelim 25:9 teaches that once a thought or action has rendered a vessel susceptible to impurity, it remains susceptible until an action is taken to annul its susceptibility (for an interpretation see there). What this means in our case is that if one harvested the grain to use it for food the handles are susceptible to impurity and remain that way even if he changes his mind and decides to use it as skhakh.
וכי תימא: הני מילי – כלים דחשיבי, אבל ידות דלצורך אכילה נינהו, במחשבה נעשה, ובמחשבה סלקא.
And if you will say that this refers only to vessels which are of importance but that handles which are needed only as aids for the eating of the food, are made [susceptible to uncleanness] by intention and are also unmade by intention [it may be objected],
You might have thought that the rule from that mishnah applies only to vessels which are of importance. But maybe, you might think, it would not apply to handles of food that are not so important. Since they are of less importance and making something a handle is only a matter of intent (your intent to use it to hold food) they can become unsusceptible to impurity merely by thought.
והתנן: כל ידות האוכלין שבססן בגורן – טהורות, (ורבי יוסי מטמא).
But have we not learned: The handles of all foodstuffs that are threshed in the threshing-floor are insusceptible to ritual uncleanliness, and R. Yose declares them susceptible?
The Talmud now continues the difficulty. It cites a mishnah that seems to say that once one has threshed grain on the threshing floor the handles are no longer susceptible to impurity because he has shown that he is not interested in having the grain attached to the handles.
בשלמא למאן דאמר בססן התיר אגודן – שפיר, אלא למאן דאמר מאי בססן בססן ממש – מאי איכא למימר? –
It goes well according to the authority who says that threshing here means loosening [the sheaves], but according to the authority who says that threshing here really means threshing , what can one answer?
There are two interpretations to this mishnah. According to the first "threshing" means that he loosened the sheaves. Thus once one loosens the sheaves they are no longer susceptible to impurity. This would help us explain the rabbis in the original baraita who (according to the Talmudic interpretation) hold that if one first harvested the grain for food and then decided to use the grain for skhakh the handles are no longer susceptible to impurity. These rabbis would say that loosening the sheaves is not a real action, it is just an intent he intends to thresh the grain. The "handles" would lose their impurity when he intends to use them for skhakh. Thus deciding to use the grain for skhakh would also cause it to lose its susceptibility.
But what would we say if "threshing" meant that they actually had to be threshed. This would imply that the handles maintain their susceptibility until something is really done to them they are threshed. Similarly, simply intending to use the grain for skhakh would not be enough to prevent the handles from being susceptible to impurity.
הכא נמי שבססן ממש.
That in the previous case also, he actually threshed them.
The Talmud now offers another interpretation for that earlier baraita. The rabbis say that the handles are not susceptible to impurity only if he first threshed them, and then intended to use the straw and handles as skhkakh.
אי הכי, מאי טעמייהו דאחרים?
If so, what is the reason of the others ?
Now that we’ve made the rabbis’ opinion reasonable, we have the same problem with the "others" who held that the handles are susceptible to impurity. If he threshed them why should they be susceptible to impurity?
דאמור כרבי יוסי. דתנן: רבי יוסי מטמא.
They hold the same opinion as R. Yose, as we have learned, R. Yose declares them susceptible to uncleanness.
The "others" hold that threshing is not sufficient of an action to cause the handles to be susceptible to impurity. They remain susceptible in any case.
This sugya will continue on the next page, so stay tuned!