Megillah, Daf Yod Tet, Part 6

 

Introduction

This section interprets a new mishnah. It’s a bit complex so be prepared.

 

משנה. הכל כשרין לקרות את המגילה חוץ מחרש שוטה וקטן, רבי יהודה מכשיר בקטן.

 

All are valid to read the Megillah except a deaf person, an imbecile and a minor.

Rabbi Judah validates a minor.

 

The Talmud will deal at length with the deaf person. Usually these three categories of people are exempt from mitzvoth because they do not have "da’at" which I would translate as "awareness." They were not socialized into society because they could not communicate fully with others.

We should note that the deaf person here must be one who knows how to speak. If he can’t speak then he couldn’t read the Megillah in any case. This makes it somewhat of an unusual category, for usually when the Talmud refers to a deaf person, it refers to a deaf-mute who truly could not communicate. A deaf person who can speak is a different category altogether.

 

גמרא. מאן תנא חרש דיעבד נמי לא? – אמר רב מתנה: רבי יוסי היא, דתנן: הקורא את שמע ולא השמיע לאזנויצא, רבי יוסי אומר: לא יצא.

 

GEMARA. Who is the Tanna that holds that [even if] the deaf person has read, it does not count?

R. Matanah said: It is R. Yose, as we have learned: One who read the Shema but doesn’t make it heard to his ears, he has fulfilled his obligation. R. Yose says that he has not fulfilled his obligation.

 

Most of our sugya will be taken up by comparing our mishnah in Megillah with a mishnah in Berakhot. In that mishnah, R. Yose and an anonymous opinion debate whether one has to make the Shema audible to his ears. R. Yose says that if he doesn’t hear it, he has not fulfilled his obligation. R. Matanah holds that R. Yose is the author of our mishnah in Megillah as well. He would hold that a deaf person who can speak still cannot fulfill the mitzvah of the Megillah since he cannot hear it himself. And if he cannot fulfill the mitzvah himself, he cannot fulfill it for others. The first opinion would hold that he can fulfill the mitzvah, and therefore could, at least ex post facto, fulfill it for others as well.

 

וממאי דרבי יוסי היא, ודיעבד נמי לא? דלמא רבי יהודה היא, ולכתחלה הוא דלא, הא דיעבדשפיר דמי! – לא סלקא דעתך, דקתני חרש דומיא דשוטה וקטן, מה שוטה וקטן דיעבד נמי לא, אף חרשדיעבד נמי לא.

 

But how do we know that [our Mishnah] follows R. Yose and even if the deaf person has read, it does not count? Perhaps it follows R. Judah, and [what it means is that] the deaf person should not read, but if he has read, his reading is accepted?

Do not think such a thing: For a deaf person is mentioned in the same category as an imbecile and a minor; just as the reading of an imbecile and a minor is not accepted ex post facto, so the reading of a deaf man is not accepted ex post facto.

 

The Talmud will now question whether our mishnah can accord only with R. Yose. Perhaps it could accord with R. Judah, who is identified as the opinion that disagrees with R. Yose in Berakhot (the mishnah about Shema). Perhaps our mishnah means that a deaf person should not read the Megillah ab initio, but that if he does, it is valid ex post facto.

This understanding is rejected because the mishnah equates a deaf person with an imbecile and a minor just as their reading cannot fulfill the obligation of others, so too the reading of deaf person cannot.

 

ודלמא הא כדאיתא והא כדאיתא! – מדקתני סיפא: רבי יהודה מכשיר בקטןמכלל דרישא לאו רבי יהודה היא.

 

But perhaps there is one rule for the one and another rule for the other?

Since it teaches in the final clause that R. Judah validates a minor, we may conclude that the first clause does not state the opinion of R. Judah.

 

It might be possible that there would be a different rule for the minor and imbecile than there is for the deaf person. This would allow R. Judah to be the author of the first half of the mishnah. A deaf person should not read, but a minor and an imbecile cannot read.

But this is problematic because if R. Judah is the author of the second half of the mishnah, then he cannot be the author of the first half.

 

(ודלמא כולה רבי יהודה היא? מי דמי? רישא לפסולה וסיפא לכשירה.)

 

(But perhaps the whole of the Mishnah states the opinions of R. Judah? Is it possible that he should disqualify in the first and permit in the second?)

 

This entire section is erased by Rashi, so I will not explain it here.

 

ודלמא כולה רבי יהודה היא, ותרי גווני קטן קתני לה, וחסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני: הכל כשרין לקרות את המגילה חוץ מחרש שוטה וקטן, במה דברים אמוריםבקטן שלא הגיע לחינוך, אבל בקטן שהגיע לחינוךאפילו לכתחלה, שרבי יהודה מכשיר בקטן.

 

But perhaps the whole [of the Mishnah] is R. Judah, and he teaches of two kinds of minors, and the Mishnah is lacking and it should teach this: All are qualified to read the Megillah, except a deaf man, an imbecile and a minor. What is this speaking of? Of a minor who is not old enough to be educated in the mitzvot. But a minor who is old enough to be educated in the mitzvot may read even ab initio, since R. Judah declares a minor qualified!

 

The Talmud now suggests emending the mishnah so that the whole thing accords with R. Judah. This would then mean that the deaf person should not read the Megillah, but that if he does read the Megillah, those who heard it from him have fulfilled their obligation.

 

במאי אוקימתאכרבי יהודה, ודיעבד. אלא הא דתני (רבי) יהודה בריה דרבי שמעון בן פזי: חרש המדבר ואינו שומעתורם לכתחלה, מני? אי רבי יהודהדיעבד אין, לכתחלה לא. אי רבי יוסידיעבד נמי לא!

 

How then have you explained [the first clause of the Mishnah]? Like R. Judah and ex post facto. Then that which was taught by R. Judah the son of R. Shimon b. Pazzi: One who can speak but not hear may set aside terumah ab initio. Whose view is this? If you say, R. Judah, he holds that this is only ex post facto, but not ab initio. If you say R. Yose, he invalidates the action even ex post facto.

 

Up to now, we have said that the mishnah follows R. Judah who says that the deaf person should not read the Megillah, but that if he does, his reading is valid. R. Yose would hold that even if he does read the Megillah, his reading is valid. The problem is that we have a mishnah concerning the separation of terumah (given to the priest) which allows a deaf person who can speak and therefore say the blessing, to give terumah ab initio. But this opinon would not accord with either R. Judah or R. Yose!

 

ואלא מאירבי יהודה ואפילו לכתחלה? אלא הא דתניא: לא יברך אדם ברכת המזון בלבו, ואם בירךיצא, מני? לא רבי יהודה ולא רבי יוסי. אי רבי יהודהאפילו לכתחלה, אי רבי יוסיאפילו דיעבד נמי לא!

 

What then will you say? That it follows R. Judah, and that he allows it even ab initio? What about this which has been taught: One should not bless birkat hamazon in his heart, but if he does do so, he has fulfilled his obligation.

Whose opinion is this? It is neither that of R. Judah nor that of R. Yose. For if it were R. Judah, it would allow this even ab initio, and if R. Yose, it would disallow it even ex post facto.

 

The Talmud now allows for a minute that R. Judah would allow the deaf person ab initio to give terumah. The problem is that we have yet another baraita that allows the deaf person to recite a blessing only ex post facto. So we’re up against the same problem again how to explain the dispute between R. Judah and R. Yose such that all tannaitic sources can be explained according to it.

 

לעולם רבי יהודה, ואפילו לכתחילה, ולא קשיא; האדידיה, האדרביה. דתניא, רבי יהודה אומר משום רבי אלעזר בן עזריה: הקורא את שמע צריך שישמיע לאזנו, שנאמר: +דברים ו‘+ שמע ישראל האלהינו האחדהשמע לאזניך מה שאתה מוציא מפיך. רבי מאיר אומר: +דברים ו‘+ אשר אנכי מצוך היום על לבבךאחר כוונת הלב הן הן הדברים.

 

In fact it follows R. Judah, and he holds that the deaf person can read even ab initio, and there is no difficulty: in the first quotation he is giving his own opinion, in the second that of his teacher, as it has been taught: R. Judah says in the name of R. Elazar b. Azariah: One who recites the Shema should make it heard to his ears, as it says, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is One" Make heard to your ear what your mouth says. R. Meir says: "Which I command you this day upon your heart" according to the words follow the intention of the heart.

 

We now find another baraita that allows us to posit that Rabbi Judah himself holds that a deaf person may ab initio recite a blessing. This is the mishnah about dedicating terumah. It was his rabbi, R. Elazar b. Azariah, who held that a deaf person should not read because he cannot hear, but if he does, it is still valid. This matches the baraita about birkat hamazon.

 

השתא דאתית להכי, אפילו תימא רבי יהודה כרביה סבירא ליה. והא דתני יהודה בריה דרבי שמעון בן פזירבי מאיר היא.

 

Now that you have come to this, you may even say that R. Judah was of the same opinion as his teacher, and the statement made by R. Judah the son of R. Shimon b. Pazzi follows R. Meir.

 

The baraita that we just taught contains a dispute between R. Judah (in the name of his teacher) and R. Meir. According to R. Judah he should make his blessing audible, but if he does not, it is still valid, whereas R. Meir says it need not be audible even ab initio.

Now that we know of this dispute, we can attribute the baraita about terumah which R. Judah son of R. Shimon b. Pazzi taught to R. Meir. It need not be R. Yose or R. Judah.

In the end there are three opinions concerning a deaf person who can speak. According to R. Judah ab initio he shouldn’t read because he cannot hear, but ex post facto, his reading is valid. According to R. Meir, even ab initio he can read. There is no need for him to hear. And according to R. Yose, even ex post facto, his reading is invalid.