Megillah, Daf Kaf Zayin, Part 4
Introduction
Today’s section begins with a mishnah concerning selling a synagogue.
משנה.
אין מוכרין בית הכנסת אלא על תנאי שאם ירצו יחזירוהו, דברי רבי מאיר.
וחכמים אומרים: מוכרין אותו ממכר עולם, חוץ מארבעה דברים: למרחץ, ולבורסקי, לטבילה, ולבית המים.
רבי יהודה אומר: מוכרין אותה לשם חצר, והלוקח מה שירצה יעשה.
1) They may not sell a synagogue except with the stipulation that it may be bought back whenever they want, the words of Rabbi Meir.
2) But the sages say: they may sell it in perpetuity, except for four purposes for it to become one of four things: a bathhouse, a tannery, a ritual bath, or a urinal.
3) Rabbi Judah says: they may sell it to be a courtyard, and the purchaser may do what he likes with it.
Section one: Rabbi Meir holds that the community can sell the synagogue but only on condition that the synagogue can be bought back any time they wish. It sounds like Rabbi Meir intends to say that while the community may sell the synagogue because they need to buy holier items, what the community should really do is save up so that they can buy the synagogue back. Also, if they saw that the synagogue was being put to improper use, they could demand to purchase it back immediately.
Section two: The rabbis are more lenient when it comes to selling the synagogue and do not require the seller to be able to buy it back whenever he should so please. The one restriction is that the sellers may not sell it knowing that it will be used for a something smelly (a tannery, a urinal) or for something where people will be naked (a bathhouse or a ritual bath).
Section three: Rabbi Judah points out that if the synagogue s owners cannot by right repurchase the synagogue, then the new owners can trick the system by first buying it to be a courtyard and then doing with it whatever they like, including turning it into a urinal. It is unclear whether Rabbi Judah says that this is permitted and there s nothing that can be done about it, or what he is really doing is criticizing the sages position by pointing out that they can t really enforce their halakhah. As we shall see in the next mishnah, Rabbi Judah believes that a synagogue retains its sanctity even after it is destroyed. It therefore seems less likely that Rabbi Judah would condone the synagogue becoming something like a urinal.
גמרא. ולרבי מאיר היכי דיירי בה? הא הויא לה רבית!
אמר רבי יוחנן: רבי מאיר בשיטת רבי יהודה אמרה, דאמר: צד אחד ברבית – מותר. דתניא: הרי שהיה נושה בחבירו מנה ועשה לו שדהו מכר, בזמן שמוכר אוכל פירות – מותר, לוקח אוכל פירות – אסור. רבי יהודה אומר: אפילו לוקח אוכל פירות מותר.
GEMARA. According to R. Meir’s ruling, how do people live in it? [The rent they pay] would be interest!
R. Yohanan said: R. Meir follows the view of R. Judah, who said that interest which is only contingent is permitted, as it has been taught: If a man lent another a man a 100 zuz and the latter made a [conditional] sale to him of his field, if the seller takes the produce, this is permitted, but if the purchaser takes the produce, it is forbidden.
R. Judah said: Even if the purchaser takes the produce it is permitted.
The problem with R. Meir’s position in the mishnah is that by making the sale conditional on its return, the people living in it are in a sense benefiting from interest. When the people sold the synagogue they received money and they gave the building to the buyers. The buyers lived in it for a while and then returned it to the sellers and got their money back. Because the sale was only temporary, it was in essence a loan and by living in it, the buyers/lenders are enjoying interest. So how can this be allowed?
The answer is that R. Meir holds that if the loan was only contingent, then interest is allowed, a position ascribed to R. Judah. In the situation described by the baraita Reuven loans money to Shimon. Shimon in returns gives him the field as security on the loan, a type of conditional sale. If Shimon defaults, the field will go to Reuven in return for Shimon’s debt. According to the first opinion, Shimon may derive benefit from the produce of the field, but Reuven may not because that would be interest. Should Shimon repay his debut, Reuven will get his money back and meanwhile have received benefit from the field. But R. Judah says that even Reuven may take the produce.
Based on R. Judah, R. Meir allows the purchasers of the synagogue to live in the building because it is not certain that it will be returned to the sellers. The sellers have a right to repurchase it, but there is no certainty that they will do so.
ואמר רבי יהודה: מעשה בביתוס בן זונן שעשה שדהו מכר על פי רבי אלעזר בן עזריה, ולוקח אוכל פירות היה. – אמרו לו: משם ראיה? מוכר אוכל פירות היה, ולא לוקח. –
R. Judah further said: It happened once that Baitus b. Zunin made a sale of his field with the permission of R. Elazar b. Azariah, and the purchaser took the produce. They said to him: Do you cite that as a proof? It was in fact the seller who took the produce and not the purchaser.
This is the continuation of the baraita from above. R. Judah proves from an actual case in which a man sold a field, meaning he used it to secure a loan, and the purchaser, that is to say, the lender, ate the produce. This seems like interest, but because the sale was contingent, it is permitted.
The other rabbis revise what actually happened. It was not the purchaser of the field, i.e. the lender who ate the produce. It was the seller, i.e. the borrower, who at it.
מאי בינייהו? – צד אחד ברבית איכא בינייהו. מר סבר: צד אחד ברבית – מותר, ומר סבר: צד אחד ברבית – אסור.
What do they argue about? They differ on the question of contingent interest; one authority [R. Judah] held that contingent interest is permitted, and the other held that it is forbidden.
The Talmud now explains the dispute in the baraita. R. Judah holds that since the use of the produce will be considered interest only if the borrower repays the loan and takes back his field, it is permitted. In other words, since the produce is interest only if one possibility occurs (repayment of loan), it is not interest and the lender/buyer may eat the produce. The other position holds that even though the borrower may repay the loan, since he might not, the lender cannot take the produce.
רבא אמר: דכולי עלמא צד אחד ברבית אסור, והכא רבית על מנת להחזיר איכא בינייהו. מר סבר: רבית על מנת להחזיר – מותר, ומר סבר: אסור.
Rava said: All agree that contingent interest is forbidden, and they differ on taking interest on condition of returning it. One authority [R. Judah] held that to take interest on condition of returning it is permitted, while the other held that it is forbidden.
Rava reinterprets the dispute in the baraita. Rava says that if this was simply a case of using the field as security for the loan, the lender is not allowed to take the produce. However, in this case the lender promised to return the produce if the borrower repays his debt. In other words, he took interest but promised to return it later, if it turned out to be a loan and not a sale. R. Judah would say that in such a case it is permitted to take the interest, because if the produce of the field turns out to be interest, he will return it anyway.
The other opinion holds that since when he takes the produce it is interest, it is forbidden to do so.