Megillah, Daf Kaf Vav, Part 4

Megillah, Daf Kaf Vav, Part 4

 

Introduction

Today’s section returns to a discussion of the Mishnah–if one sells a synagogue the proceeds can be used to buy a Torah ark. This implies that the proceeds from the sale of the synagogue retain their holiness and cannot be put to a secular purpose.

 

אמר רבא: לא שנו אלא שלא מכרו שבעה טובי העיר במעמד אנשי העיר, אבל מכרו שבעה טובי העיר במעמד אנשי העיר אפילו למישתא ביה שיכרא שפיר דמי.

 

Rava said: This rule was only taught where the seven "good men" of the town did not sell [the synagogue] in the assembly of the townspeople. But if the seven "good men" of the town sold it in the assembly of the townspeople, even if it was to drink liquor in it, the transaction is good.

 

Rava says that the Mishnah’s rule that if one sells a synagogue the proceeds remain holy refers only to a case where it was not sold by a group called "the seven good men of the town" in front of the town assembly. But if they sold the synagogue with the permission of the assembly, then the holiness leaves the money and the proceeds can be used for anything, even to buy a bar (you might not want to tell the board about this one). This seems to be a case where the will of the people trumps the inherent holiness of space. If the people wish to sell the synagogue, they have a right to do so.

רבינא הוה ליה ההוא תילא דבי כנישתא אתא לקמיה דרב אשי, אמר ליה: מהו למיזרעה? אמר ליה: זיל זבניה משבעה טובי העיר במעמד אנשי העיר, וזרעה.

 

Ravina had the ground (the tel) of a synagogue. He came in front of R. Ashi and said to him: Can seeds be planted there. He replied: Go and buy it from the seven "good men" of the town in the assembly of the townspeople, and you may then sow it.

 

This story illustrates what we learned above about selling the synagogue in front of the town assembly. In addition, it shows a real setting in which someone might want to sell the synagogue. In this story, the synagogue has already fallen apart and Ravina wants to use the land on which the synagogue once stood in order to plant a field. This contrasts with Rava’s abstract halakhah one can sell the synagogue even to make it into a bar. Abstract halakhah takes principles to extremes, whereas real life tends to be more nuanced. In real life, a standing synagogue is not being sold in order to build a drinking hole; a field on which once stood a synagogue is merely being used to plant a field.

 

רמי בר אבא הוה קא בני בי כנישתא, הוה ההיא כנישתא עתיקא הוה בעי למיסתריה ולאתויי ליבני וכשורי מינה, ועיולי להתם. יתיב וקא מיבעיא ליה הא דרב חסדא. דאמר רב חסדא: לא ליסתור בי כנישתא עד דבני בי כנישתא אחריתי, התםמשום פשיעותא, כי האי גוונא מאי? – אתא לקמיה דרב פפאואסר ליה, לקמיה דרב הונאואסר ליה.

 

Rami b. Abba was building a synagogue. There was a certain old synagogue which he wanted to tear down, and to bring the bricks and beams from it and use them for the other. He was sitting and trying to figure out the implications of what R. Hisda had said, for R. Hisda said: A man should not tear down a synagogue until he has built another [to take its place]. The reason there [that it was prohibited] was so that there should be no negligence.

But what about in a case like this? He came in front of R. Papa, who forbade him; and in front of R. Huna, and he also forbade him.

 

R. Hisda had said that one may not tear down one synagogue unless a new synagogue was built. Rami b. Abba, a later sage, wanted to know if that meant that it was prohibited to remove the building parts from one synagogue that was old and use them to build a new synagogue. He thought that perhaps as long as he was in the process of building a new synagogue he could use the bricks and beams from the old synagogue, because it is clear that he won’t be left for long without any synagogue. He asked his question in front of two authorities and both of them forbade him from doing so.

 

אמר רבא: האי בי כנישתא, חלופה וזבונהשרי, אוגורה ומשכונהאסור. מאי טעמאבקדושתה קאי. ליבני נמי, חלופינהו וזבונינהושרי, אוזופינהואסור. הני מיליבעתיקתא, אבל בחדתאלית לן בה. ואפילו למאן דאמר הזמנה מילתא היאהני מילי כגון האורג בגד למת, אבל הכאכטווי לאריג דמי, וליכא למאן דאמר.

 

Rava said: This synagogue it may be exchanged or sold [for secular purposes], but may not be rented out or pledged [to secure a loan].

What is the reason? [In the latter case] its holiness remains.

Its bricks also may be exchanged or sold [for secular purposes], but they may not be lent out.

This rule applies only to old ones, but in the case of new ones there is no objection.

And even if we adopt the view that the mere intention [to use a thing for a certain purpose] has force, this refers to a case, for instance, when one weaves a shroud for a dead body, but in this case [the bricks and beams in question] are like thread which has still to be woven into cloth, and no one says [that in such a case there is force in mere intention].

 

Rava says that one may sell or exchange a synagogue or its bricks for something that is not sacred (secular). However, one may not lend the synagogue out, rent it or pledge it to secure a loan. This is because a sale or exchange would mean that the synagogue is no longer holy. Therefore it could be used for secular purposes. But if the synagogue and its bricks remains a synagogue and it is just used for some secular purpose, then one is making secular use out of sacred space, which is prohibited.

However, this applies only to bricks that have been used already in building the synagogue. If, however, the bricks were merely designated for use in building a synagogue, they are not yet holy and secular use may be made of them. They remain raw material. This is not similar to one who weaves a shroud for a dead body. In that case, merely designating the shroud to be used for the dead body prohibits it from other use. In that case designation has force it as if the item has already been used in the way that it is intended to be use. The bricks made to be used in the synagogue are more like a case of one who makes thread to use in making the cloth that will be used in making the shroud. The thread is still raw material and the intent to use it to make a shroud is not halakhically significant. So too these bricks are still raw material.

 

מתנה, פליגי בה רב אחא ורבינא, חד אסר וחד שרי. מאן דאסרבהאי תפקע קדושתה? ומאן דשרי: אי לאו דהוה ליה הנאה מיניהלא הוה יהיב ליה, הדר הוה ליה מתנה כזביני.

 

[With regard to a synagogue which has been made] a gift, R. Aha and Ravina disagree, one forbids [it to be used for secular purposes] and one permits. The one who forbade how is its sanctity removed? While the one who permitted if the giver [the giver] did not derive some benefit from the act he would not give it, so that in the end the gift is equivalent to a sale.

 

R. Aha and Ravina disagree over whether a synagogue that the townspeople gave to someone as a gift remains holy. According to one opinion, it does. This is different from a sale, for in a sale, the synagogue loses its holiness, but the money used to purchase it becomes holy. Thus the holiness has somewhere to go. But in a gift, there is nothing which can be used to take away the holiness from the synagogue. Its sanctity is not removed.

The other opinion holds that the giver receives satisfaction from giving the synagogue away and that satisfaction is enough to remove the holiness from the synagogue.

It is an interesting view because it says that an act of altruism (giving something away) is really like a sale the giver benefits. It’s an interesting concept that appears in several places throughout the Talmud.