Kiddushin, Daf Samekh Zayin, Part 5

Introduction

Yesterday s sugya ended by saying that kiddushin are both ab initio prohibited and ex post facto ineffective with one s wife s sister. The Talmud now tries to expand this to all incestual relations. In other words, we know that one cannot have sex with someone prohibited because of incest. But how do we know that if a man tries to betroth such a woman, the betrothal is ineffective.

אשכחן אחות אשה שאר עריות מנלן ילפינן מאחות אשה מה אחות אשה מיוחדת שהיא ערוה וחייבין על זדונה כרת ועל שגגתה חטאת ולא תפסי בה קידושין אף כל שהיא ערוה וחייבין על זדונה כרת ועל שגגתה חטאת לא תפסי בה קידושין

Thus we have found [this] of a wife s sister; how we do know it of other incestual relationships?

We learn then from a wife’s sister: just as a wife’s sister is distinguished in that she is a incestuous relationship punishable if committed intentionally by karet, and resulting in a sin-offering if done unwittingly, and kiddushin with her is invalid; so with every incestuous relationship with whom an intentional offence involves kareth and an unwitting offence involves a sin-offering, kiddushin is invalid.

This is a simple comparison. One who has sex intentionally with his wife s sister is punished with karet (being cut off). If unwittingly (either he did not know that this is prohibited or he did not know she was his wife s sister) they must both bring a sin-offering. In this case, kiddushin is not possible. So too with other incest prohibitions kiddushin is impossible.

בשלמא כולהו אתיין אלא אשת איש ואשת אח איכא למיפרך מה לאחות אשה שכן אין לה היתר במקום מצוה תאמר באשת אח שיש לה היתר במקום מצוה

Now, as for all [others], it goes well, for they may be derived; but as for a married woman and a brother’s wife, we can raise a difficulty: As for a wife’s sister, [the invalidity of kiddushin] is because she is not permitted [even] where there is a commandment; will you say [the same] of a brother’s wife, who is permitted where there is a commandment?

The Talmud raises a difficulty concerning the analogy of a wife s sister to the case of a brother s wife. If the brother dies without children, then there is a mitzvah to marry her. So maybe in this, the kiddushin would be valid (even not in a case of yibbum) for she is not like a wife s sister, who is never permitted. There is never a mitzvah to marry one s wife s sister.

אשת איש נמי איכא למיפרך מה להנך שכן אין לה היתר בחיי אוסרן תאמר באשת איש שיש לה היתר בחיי אוסרן

[The analogy with] a married woman also may be refuted: as for these, [the invalidity of kiddushin] is because she cannot be permitted while they who make her prohibited are alive; will you say [the same] of a married woman, who can be permitted during the lifetime of him who renders her forbidden?

The analogy between a married woman and a wife s sister is also difficult. The wife s sister is prohibited as long as the wife is alive. It does not change at divorce. But a married woman is prohibited only while married. Once she is divorced, she is permitted. So maybe kiddushin is possible with a married woman but not with a wife s sister. I know, this sounds absurd (that a man could betroth an already married woman), but sometimes arguments are made out of the necessities of logic and not because they make real sense.

In tomorrow s exciting conclusion to this week s daf we will finally learn how we know that betrothal with incestuous relations is not possible.