Kiddushin, Daf Samekh, Part 1

 

Introduction

According to Rav, if the man says Be betrothed to me now and after thirty days we do not know if he made a stipulation or a retraction. If another person comes and betroths her within the thirty days, then if it we consider it a stipulation she is married to the first man, but we consider it a retraction she is married to the second. This leaves her doubtfully married to both and requiring a get from both.

 

אמר אביי ולטעמיה דרב בא אחד ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר ל’ יום ובא אחר ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר עשרים יום ובא אחר ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר עשרה ימים מראשון ומאחרון צריכה גט מאמצעי אינה צריכה גט

מה נפשך אי תנאה הואי דקמא קידושי דהנך לאו קידושי אי חזרה הואי דבתרא קידושי דהנך לאו קידושי

 

Abaye said: According to Rav s reasoning, if one came and said to her, Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after thirty days and then another came and said to her, Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after twenty days : and then another came and said to her, Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after ten days : she requires a get from the first and the last, but not from the middle one. For what else could you hold: if it is a stipulation, then that of the first is [valid] kiddushin, but not those of the others if it is retraction, that of the last is kiddushin, but not of the others.

 

Abaye explains that if there are multiple betrothers, Rav would hold that she can only be betrothed to either the first (if the statement is taken as a stipulation) or the last (if it was a retraction). She could not be betrothed to any of the middle ones.

 

פשיטא מהו דתימא האי לישנא משמע תנאה ומשמע חזרה ותיבעי גיטא מכל חד וחד קמ"ל

 

But is this not obvious? What might I have thought? This language implies both stipulation and retraction, and she requires a divorce from each: hence it teaches us [otherwise].

 

Were it not for Abaye we might have thought that now and after thirty days could imply both a stipulation and a retraction. This would mean that she would be doubtfully betrothed to each man and require a get from all of them. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that to Rav the language means either stipulation or retraction. Not both.

 

עולא אמר רבי יוחנן אפי’ מאה תופסין בה

וכן אמר ר’ אסי אמר רבי יוחנן אפילו מאה תופסין בה אמר ליה רב משרשיא בריה דרב אמי לר’ אסי אסברה לך טעמא דרבי יוחנן שוו נפשיה כי שרגא דליבני דכל חד וחד רוחא לחבריה שבק

 

Ulla said in the name of R. Yohanan: Even a hundred are effective with her.

And so too R. Assi said in the name of R. Yohanan: Even a hundred are effective with her.

R. Mesharasheya son of R. Ammi said to R. Assi: I will explain R. Yohanan s reason to you: they made themselves like a row of bricks, each leaving room for the next.

 

R. Yohanan holds that each act of betrothal was partial, leaving room for the next. Therefore, they all must give her a get. This seems to differ from the approaches we saw above. The idea would be that the betrothal begins immediately but does not fully take effect for another thirty days. Therefore, she is betrothed to them all.

 

מתיב רב חנינא מהיום ולאחר מיתה גט ואינו גט ואם מת חולצת ולא מתייבמת

בשלמא לרב מסייעא ליה לשמואל נמי הא מני רבנן היא ואנן דאמרי כרבי

אלא לר’ יוחנן דאמר שיורא הוי כל גיטא דמשייר בה ולא כלום הוא יבומי מייבם

 

R. Hanina raised an objection: [If one declares, Be divorced from me] from today and after my death, it is a divorce and not a divorce, and if he dies, she must perform halitzah, but not yibum.

Now, according to Rav this goes well, for this supports him;

According to Shmuel too, [there is no difficulty,] for [he may say], This agrees with the Rabbis, whereas I hold according to Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi].

But according to R. Yohanan who holds that something he left room [for others to betroth her]: every get which leaves something in her [tied to her husband] is entirely invalid: then let him perform yibum?

 

This baraita seems to imply that when one says Behold this is your divorce from today and after it is doubtful whether it is a stipulation from today if I die in which case she is divorced or a retraction (and means she is divorced only after his death) in which case she is not divorced. To remedy the situation she must have halitzah (in case she is not divorced) but can t do yibbum (in case she was divorced). This accords well with Rav. And Shmuel could say that this baraita holds like the Rabbis whereas he holds like Rabbi according to whom the divorce is valid for he holds that it is a stipulation.

But according to R. Yohanan who holds that these statements imply partial application, this statement should not work at all for there can be no partial divorce. There is a rule that the divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife. If so, she should be able to have yibbum for she is a widow not a divorcee.

 

אמר רבא גט להוציא ומיתה להוציא מה ששייר גט גמרתו מיתה

 

Rava said: The divorce is to free [her], and death is likewise to free her; [hence] what the divorce leaves [undone] is completed by death.

 

Rava explains that to R. Yohanan in this case the divorce is partial but death completes the severing of the ties. Therefore, even R. Yohanan can explain why she must have halitzah (she s not fully a divorcee) but not yibbum (she is partially a divorcee).

 

אמר ליה אביי מי דמי גט מוציאה מרשות יבם מיתה מכנסה לרשות יבם

 

Abaye said to him: Is it the same! Divorce frees her from the yavam s authority, whereas death places her in the yavam s authority?

 

Abaye notes that we cannot so easily combine the effects of divorce with the effects of death. Divorce causes her to be exempt from yibbum whereas death makes her liable for yibbum. Thus we need another way for R. Yohanan to read the baraita according to which she must undergo halitzah and not yibbum.

 

אלא אמר אביי התם טעמא מאי גזירה משום מהיום אם מתי הרי זה גט

 

Rather Abaye said: What is the reason there? It is a preventative decree, on account of From today, if I die, which is certainly a valid divorce.

 

Abaye says that in principle R. Yohanan would hold that if he says From today and when I die this would not be a valid get and she could have yibbum (because she would be a widow). But he does not allow her to undergo yibbum lest people think that the same would be true if he says, From today if I die which is definitely a valid get, since this is certainly a stipulation.

ונגזור מהיום אם מתי דתחלוץ אטו מהיום ולאחר מיתה

 

Then let us decree that [if he says,] From today, if I die, she should perform halitzah on account of from today and after death!

 

The Talmud notes that the logic should work in the other direction as well. If we say that she cannot have yibbum in one case then we should say the same about the other case. In other words, they are both similar, so we should not let he have yibbum in one lest she come to perform yibbum in the other.

 

אם אתה אומר חולצת מתייבמת

הכא נמי אם אתה אומר חולצת מתייבמת

תתייבם ואין בכך כלום חששא דרבנן הוא

 

Should you say that she must perform halitzah, she may come to have yibum.

Then here too, if you say that she must perform halitzah, she may come to have yibum?

Then let her, and it does not matter, seeing that it is only a rabbinic concern.

 

In the end, the Talmud admits that while it is preferable for her to have halitzah in a case where he says from today and after my death if she does have yibbum it is not a problem. Again, in this case there is no real doubt to R. Yohanan that this is not a valid divorce. It is only a rabbinic prohibition that she should have halitzah and not yibbum lest people allow the woman divorced by a man who said from today if I die who most certainly may not have yibbum.