Kiddushin, Daf Nun Tet, Part 6
Introduction
Today s sugya begins addressing the next section of the mishnah which reads:
Similarly, if he says to a woman, Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second.
מקודשת לשני
אמר רב מקודשת לשני לעולם ושמואל אמר מקודשת לשני עד ל’ יום לאחר ל’ יום פקעי קידושי שני וגמרי קידושי ראשון
She is betrothed to the second: Rav said: She is permanently betrothed to the second; Shmuel said: She is betrothed to the second until [the end of the] thirty days, after which the betrothal of the second is removed and that of the first is completed.
Rav says that once betrothed to the second, she is permanently betrothed to him. Shmuel says that the betrothal is only effective till the thirty days are over. At that point the first man s kiddushin begin to take effect and she is now betrothed to him. The betrothal to the second ends. Yes, this is really weird!
יתיב רב חסדא וקא קשיא ליה קידושי שני במאי פקעי
אמר ליה רב יוסף מר ארישא מתני לה וקשיא ליה רב יהודה אסיפא מתני לה ולא קשיא ליה מעכשיו ולאחר שלשים יום וכו’
R. Hisda sat, and found this difficult: How is the betrothal of the second removed?
R. Joseph said to him: You, Master, taught this in connection with the first clause, and so find it difficult; but Rav Judah teaches it in connection with the second clause, and finds no difficulty: From now and after thirty days .
R. Hisda does not understand how the betrothal of the second could just simply be removed. Poof! After all, the first person s betrothal does not begin until after thirty days. The second person s betrothal should be permanent.
To solve the problem, R. Joseph offers another context for Rav and Shmuel s dispute. He also slightly modifies the words. The dispute between Rav and Shmuel is on the second clause of the mishnah, where the first man says, From now and after thirty days and then a second man betroths her during that thirty day period. The Talmud will now explain how their dispute maps out onto this clause.
אמר רב מקודשת ואינה מקודשת לעולם ושמואל אמר מקודשת ואינה מקודשת אלא עד ל’ יום לאחר ל’ פקעי קידושי שני וגמרי קידושי ראשון
לרב מספקא ליה אי תנאה הואי אי חזרה הואי
לשמואל פשיטא ליה דתנאה הואי
Rav said: She is betrothed and not betrothed permanently: Whereas Shmuel ruled: She is betrothed and not betrothed only until [the end of the] thirty days, after which the betrothal of the second is removed and that of the first is completed.
Rav is in doubt whether it is a stipulation or a retraction; whereas Shmuel is certain that it is a stipulation.
Rav does not know whether the first betrother intended his statement as a stipulation, If I do not change my mind within thirty days, you will be betrothed to me from now or a retraction, i.e. No you are not betrothed to me until after thirty days. If it was a stipulation, then she would be married to the first man. If a retraction, then she is married to the second because the first kiddushin was never valid. Therefore, she is doubtfully betrothed to both men and will require a get from both.
Shmuel holds that the statement was a stipulation. She is doubtfully betrothed for the first thirty days but after that the second person s betrothal is removed because the first person s takes effect.
ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי דתניא מהיום ולאחר מיתה גט ואינו גט דברי חכמים רבי אומר כזה גט
[The amoraim argue about the same thing as the] following Tannaim: [If one declares, Be divorced] from today and after my death, it is a divorce and not a divorce, the words of the Sages. Rabbi ruled: It is indeed a divorce.
Rav and Shmuel have the same argument as Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] and the sages. The context here is divorce. Divorce cannot occur after death. The sages hold that when he says from today and after my death it might be a stipulation (in which case it is valid) and it might be a retraction (in which case it is not). Rabbi holds that it is a stipulation, and the get is valid, although it takes effect only after death. Rav holds like the sages and Shmuel holds like Rabbi.
ונימא רב הלכה כרבנן ונימא שמואל הלכה כרבי
צריכא דאילו אמר רב הלכה כרבנן הוה אמינא התם דלרחוקה קאתי אבל הכא דלקרובה קאתי אימא מודה ליה לשמואל דתנאה הואי
Then let Rav say: The halakhah agrees with the Sages, and let Shmuel say: The halakhah agrees with Rabbi?
It is necessary. For if Rav had said: The halakhah agrees with the Sages, I would have [that is only] there, where he comes to distance her; but here, where he draws her near, I might say that he agrees with Shmuel that it is a stipulation.
If Rav agrees with the Sages who referred to the case of divorce, why not just say the halakhah agrees with the Sages. The Talmud explains that Rav needs to teach his statement in relation to betrothal for had he not we might have thought that when it comes to betrothal, the Sages would agree with Shmuel that it is a stipulation. Since betrothal is to draw her near, we might assume that he is not retracting his statement.
ואי אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי הוה אמינא התם הוא דאין גט לאחר מיתה אבל הכא דיש קידושין לאחר ל’ אימא מודי ליה לרב צריכא
And if Shmuel said: The halakhah agrees with Rabbi, I might have said that is only there, because there is no divorce after death; but here, seeing that the kiddushin can take effect thirty days later, I might say that he agrees with Rav. Thus it is necessary.
If Shmuel had said the halakhah agrees with Rabbi I might have thought that only in that case do we interpret his statement as a stipulation because he cannot be saying Be divorced after my death. People know that one cannot divorce after death. But when it comes to kiddushin, they can take place after thirty days. So maybe in that case the man was retracting his earlier statement.