Kiddushin, Daf Nun Tet, Part 4
Introduction
Today s sugya continues the discussion of speech annulling speech. Here Resh Lakish begins to counterattack.
איתיביה ר"ל לר’ יוחנן כל הכלים יורדין לידי טומאתן במחשבה ואין עולים מידי טומאתן אלא בשינוי מעשה מעשה מוציא מיד מעשה ומיד מחשבה מחשבה אין מוציאה לא מיד מעשה ולא מיד מחשבה
בשלמא מיד מעשה לא מפקה דלא אתי דיבור ומבטל מעשה אלא מיד מחשבה מיהא תפיק
Resh Lakish objected to R. Yohanan: All utensils become liable to impurity by intention, but come out of their impurity only by an act that changes them.
An act can nullify both act and intention, but intention can nullify neither act nor intention. Now, it makes sense that it [intention] cannot nullify an act, because speech cannot nullify action; yet let it nullify intention?
The mishnah quoted here is about purity laws. A vessel becomes susceptible to impurity when one thinks that one has finished it. For instance, if I m making a dish and I intend to glaze it, it is not susceptible to impurity until I do so. But if I think to use it unglazed, it is susceptible to impurity before it is glazed. In order for it to become not susceptible to impurity, one would have to do something to it, like break it.
The mishnah then summarizes the power of acts and intention. An act is powerful enough to annul an intention or another act, but intention is not powerful enough to annul either speech or action.
This is a difficulty against R. Yohanan who holds that speech should be able to cancel other speech.
שאני מחשבה דטומאה דכי מעשה דמי וכדרב פפא דרב פפא רמי כתיב (ויקרא יא, לח) כי יתן וקרינן כי יותן הא כיצד כי יותן דומיא דכי יתן מה יתן דניחא ליה אף יותן דניחא ליה
Intention, in respect to impurity, is different, because it counts as action, and in accordance with R. Papa. For R. Papa pointed out a contradiction between verses. It is written, And if one put [yitten], (Leviticus 11:38) whereas we read, and if it be put [yuttan]. How is this so? If it be put [must be] similar to if one put : just as when one puts, it must be something he wants, so when it is put, it must be something he wants.
The Talmud resolves the difficulty by stating that the rules with regard to purity are different for in this realm thoughts can count as action. This is borne out by R. Papa s statement concerning liquids that make food susceptible to impurity. Food is not susceptible to impurity until it comes into contact with a liquid. The person does not have to put this liquid on the food because the verse is read if it be put. However, the verse is written as if it says, If one put. So the susceptibility to purity depends on whether the person would want the liquid on the food. If he would, then it is susceptible to impurity. Here we can see that in the realm of impurity, thoughts count like action.
רב זביד מתני להא שמעתתא אהא וכן היא שנתנה רשות לשלוחה לקדשה והלכה היא וקדשה את עצמה אם שלה קדמו קידושיה קידושין ואם של שלוחה קדמו אין קידושיה קידושין לא קדשה את עצמה וחזרה בה מהו
רבי יוחנן אמר חוזרת ור"ל אמר אינה חוזרת
ר’ יוחנן אמר חוזרת אתי דיבור ומבטל דיבור ר"ל אמר אינה חוזרת לא אתי דיבור ומבטל דיבור
R. Zevid taught this discussion in reference to the following: Likewise, if she authorized her agent to betroth her, and went and betrothed herself: if hers came first, her kiddushin is valid; if her agent s came first, her own kiddushin is not valid.
Now, what if she did not betroth herself, but retracted?
R. Yohanan said: She can retract; Resh Lakish said: She cannot retract.
R. Yohanan said: She can retract: Speech comes and nullifies speech.
Resh Lakish said: She cannot retract: speech cannot come and nullify speech.
R. Zevid teaches R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish s dispute in a slightly different context. Instead of teaching it about a case where the woman changed her mind with regard to kiddushin that will not take effect for thirty days, he teaches it with regard to the case of a woman who authorized her agent to betroth her and then changed her mind before the agent did so. R. Yohanan says that she can retract her words authorizing the agent to betroth her can be annulled by other words retracting his agency. Resh Lakish says she may not.
איתיביה רבי יוחנן לר"ל ביטל אם עד שלא תרם ביטל אין תרומתו תרומה אמר רבא
R. Yohanan raised a difficulty against Resh Lakish: If he annuls, if before he [his agent] has made a separation, his separation is invalid.
Now here it is speech against speech, yet one comes and nullifies the other?
The case here is one who sends an agent to separate terumah but then annuls the agency. If he does so before the agent separates the terumah, the separation is not valid. But here is a case of speech annulling speech. This seems to support R. Yohanan.
הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שקדם בעל הבית ותרם את כריו דהוה ליה מעשה
Rava said: What are we dealing with here? When the owner got there before [his agent] and separated terumah for his stacks, which is an action.
Rava solves the difficulty on R. Yohanan by positing that the case in the baraita is one in which the owner didn t really annul the agency, but gave terumah on his own, before the agent did. By doing so, he is effectively nullifying the agent s agency.
איתיביה ריש לקיש כל הכלים יורדים לידי טומאתן במחשבה ואין עולין מטומאתן אלא בשינוי מעשה מעשה מוציא מיד מעשה ומיד מחשבה מחשבה אינה מוציאה לא מיד מעשה ולא מיד מחשבה בשלמא מיד מעשה לא מפקה לא אתי דיבור ומבטל מעשה אלא מיד מחשבה מיהא תפיק
Resh Lakish objected to R. Yohanan: All utensils become liable to impurity by intention, but come out of their impurity only by an act that changes them.
An act can nullify both act and intention, but intention can nullify neither act nor intention. Now, it is well that it [intention] cannot nullify an act, because speech cannot nullify action; yet let it nullify intention?
This is the same difficulty we saw above.
א"ל שאני מחשבה דטומאה דכי מעשה דמי וכדרב פפא דרב פפא רמי כתיב כי יתן וקרינן כי יותן הא כיצד כי יותן דומיא דיתן מה יתן דניחא ליה אף יותן נמי דניחא ליה
Intention, in respect to impurity, is different, because it counts as action, and in accordance with R. Papa. For R. Papa pointed out a contradiction between verses. It is written, And if one put [yitten], (Leviticus 11:38) whereas we read, and if it be put [yuttan]. How is this so? If it be put [must be] similar to if one put : just as when one puts, it must be something he wants, so when it is put, it must be something he wants.
This is the same resolution we saw above.