Kiddushin, Daf Nun, Part 1
Introduction
Today s sugya deals with the issue of matters in one s heart, which refers to cases where a person has a particular intent but does not state that intent out loud. Is there legal significance to such cases?
גמ׳ ההוא גברא דזבין לנכסיה אדעתא למיסק לארץ ישראל ובעידנא דזבין לא אמר ולא מידי
אמר רבא הוי דברים שבלב ודברים שבלב אינם דברים
GEMARA. A certain man sold his property with the intention of moving to the Land of Israel, but when selling he said nothing. Rava said: Matters that remain in one s heart have no significance.
The man sold his land only because he wished to move to Israel, but did not say so. For some unknown reason, this did not work out (does tend to happen). Nevertheless, since he did not state that this is why he was selling the land, he cannot retract, for matters that remain in one s heart have no legal significance.
מנא ליה לרבא הא אילימא מהא דתנן (ויקרא א, ג) יקריב אותו מלמד שכופין אותו יכול בעל כרחו תלמוד לומר לרצונו הא כיצד כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני ואמאי הא בלביה לא ניחא ליה אלא לאו משום דאמרינן דברים שבלב אינן דברים
From where does Rava derive this? If we say, from what we learned: He shall offer it (Leviticus 1:3) this teaches that they compel him. I might think, against his will, Scripture says, with his free will. How is this possible? They force him, until he declares, I am willing.
Yet why, seeing that in his heart he is unwilling! Hence it must surely be because we say matters of the heart are not significant.
A mishnah teaches that if a person is obligated to bring a sacrifice but does not want to bring it, the court can physically force him to bring it. Nevertheless, he must also do so with his own free will. The court therefore forces him to say I am willing even though we know he is not. This seems to follow the rule the matters of the heart have no legal significance.
ודילמא שאני התם דאנן סהדי דניחא ליה בכפרה
But perhaps it is different there, for we are witnesses that he is pleased to gain atonement.
The Talmud rejects this as proof for Rava. In that case, although it looks like he does not want to bring a sacrifice, we can say that in truth, he would want to bring the sacrifice. So this is not a case where matters of the heart are ignored.
אלא מסיפא וכן אתה מוצא בגיטי נשים ושחרורי עבדים כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני ואמאי הא בלביה לא ניחא ליה אלא לאו משום דאמרינן דברים שבלב אינן דברים
ודלמא שאני התם משום דמצוה לשמוע דברי חכמים
Rather [we can derive Rava s principle] from the second clause: and you find it likewise in the case of women’s divorce and slaves manumission: they compel him [the husband or master], until he declares, I am willing. Yet why: seeing that in his heart he is unwilling!
Hence it must surely be because we say: Matters of the heart are not significant!
But perhaps it is different there, because it is a mitzvah to obey the words of the Sages!
The Talmud now tries to derive the principle from the second half of the same mishnah which states that the court can force a husband to divorce his wife or free his slave in cases where the court compels him to do so. But again, this is rejected. Although he says he does not want to divorce his wife, it is a mitzvah to listen to the court.
אלא אמר רב יוסף מהכא המקדש את האשה ואמר כסבור הייתי שהיא כהנת והרי היא לויה לויה ונמצאת כהנת ענייה והרי היא עשירה עשירה והרי היא ענייה מקודשת מפני שלא הטעתו ואמאי הא קאמר כסבור הייתי אלא משום דאמרינן דברים שבלב אינן דברים
Rather R. Joseph said: [It is deduced] from the following: If one betroths a woman and [then] declares, I thought her to be a priest’s daughter, whereas she is the daughter of a Levite, or a Levite’s daughter and she is the daughter of a priest ; is poor, whereas she is wealthy, or is wealthy whereas she is poor she is betrothed, because she has not deceived him.
Yet why, seeing that he declares, I thought [etc.] ? Rather it must be because we say: Matters of the heart are not significant.
R. Joseph tries to derive Rava s principle from the mishnah we just learned. The man explicitly says that he thought the woman he was betrothing was something else than she turned out to be. This seems like a strong proof that matters of the heart are not significant.
אמר ליה אביי דלמא שאני התם דלחומרא
Abaye said to him: Perhaps it is different there, for that [ruling] is a stringency!
The problem with this mishnah is that it is a stringency. It might be that the mishnah rules that she is betrothed simply as a stringency. To really prove that matters of the heart are not significant we will need to find a case that involves a leniency.
אלא אמר אביי מהכא בכולם אע"פ שאמרה בלבי היה להתקדש לו אעפ"כ אינה מקודשת
ואמאי הא קאמרה בלבי היה ודלמא
שאני התם דכיון דאתניה לאו כל כמינה דעקרא לה לתנאיה
Rather Abaye said, [it is deduced] from this: In all these cases, even if she declares, it was my intention to become betrothed to him in any case, she is not betrothed.
Yet why, seeing that she declares, It was my intention ?
But perhaps it is different there, for since he stipulated, it does not rest with her to set aside his stipulation!
Abaye cites the first half of the mishnah, which rules that when he deceives her by stipulating that he is something that he is not. She is not betrothed, even if she says that she wanted to be betrothed in any case. This again seems to prove that matters of the heart are not significant. But again, this proof is rejected. She cannot just obviate his stipulation. He said, for instance, You are betrothed to me on condition that I am a priest. If he is not a priest, she is not betrothed under any circumstance.
אלא אמר רב חייא בר אבין עובדא הוה בי רב חסדא ורב חסדא בי רב הונא ופשטוה מהא האומר לשלוחו הבא לי מן החלון או מן הדלוסקמא והביא לו אע"פ שאמר בעל הבית לא היה לי בלבי אלא על זה כיון שהביא לו מזה בעל הבית מעל
ואמאי הא קאמר בלבי אלא לאו משום דאמרינן דברים שבלב אינן דברים
Rather R. Hiyya b. Abin, this occurred at R. Hisda’s, and R. Hisda [went] to R. Huna’s [to discuss the matter], and they solved it from the following: If one says to his agent, Bring me [money] from the window [sill] or the chest, and he brings it to him, even if the master says: I was thinking only of this [purse], yet since he brought him the money from this [place], the master is guilty of trespass.
Yet why, seeing that he says: I was thinking ? Hence it must surely be because we say that matters of the heart are not significant.
In this case, the master sends his agent to get a purse left somewhere. The agent brings him something that actually belonged to the Temple. Even if the master says I didn t intend for you to bring that purse the master is liable for trespassing Temple property. Again, this proves that matters of heart are not significant.
ודלמא שאני התם דלמיפטר נפשיה מקרבן קאתי
Yet perhaps it is different there, because he comes to exempt himself from a sacrifice?
Again, it might be that in this case we don t trust him, because all he is trying to do is get himself out of a sacrifice. In other cases, matters of the heart might be considered significant.
הוה ליה למימר מזיד הוה
לא עביד איניש דמשוי נפשיה רשיעא
הוה ליה לומר נזכרתי (דתנן) נזכר בעל הבית ולא נזכר שליח שליח מעל
Then let him declare that he did it intentionally.
A person does not declare himself wicked.
Then let him say: I remembered for it was taught: If the master remembers [that it is of hekdesh] but not his agent, the latter is guilty of trespass.
The Talmud now tries to find other responses the master (the one who sends the agent) could have said to exempt himself from a sacrifice. The fact that he did not state these excuses means that he is telling the truth when he says I was thinking. And if we nevertheless don t believe him, it can only because matters of the heart are not significant.
A person who intentionally commits trespass is not liable for a sacrifice. So while theoretically he could have said I intentionally sent him to take sacred property people do not want to say that they would intentionally commit a sin.
However, he could have said I remembered that the property was holy after I sent him to get it. Since he could have said this and thereby exempted himself for a sacrifice, but did not say this, he did not need to say I was thinking [that it was not holy]. Nevertheless, we still do not believe him. This proves Rava s rule that matters of the heart are not significant.