Kiddushin, Daf Mem Zayin, Part 6

 

Introduction

The Talmud continues to discuss Rav’s statement that a loan may not be used for betrothal.

 

נימא כתנאי התקדשי לי בשטר חוב או שהיה לו מלוה ביד אחרים והירשה עליהם ר"מ אומר מקודשת וחכ"א אינה מקודשת

האי שטר חוב היכי דמי אילימא שטר חוב דאחרים היינו מלוה ביד אחרים אלא לאו שטר חוב דידה ובמקדש במלוה קמיפלגי

 

Shall we say that this [Rav’s statement] is disputed by tannaim? [For it was taught: If a man says to a woman:] “Be betrothed to me with a debt document,” or if he has a loan in the hands of others and transfers it to her: R. Meir said: She is betrothed; the Sages say: She is not betrothed.

This “debt document” what is the case? If we say, a debt document against others; then it is identical with “a loan in the hands of others?” Hence it must surely mean a debt document of her debt, and thus they differ in respect to betrothing [a woman] by a debt!

 

There are two cases in the baraita: 1) a man tries to betroth a woman by giving her a debt document; 2) he betroths her by transferring a loan that others owe him to her. The debt document must be money she owes him, otherwise the two cases are the same. Thus we have a tannaitic dispute over whether a man can betroth a woman by forgiving her debt.

 

לעולם שטר חוב דאחרים והכא במלוה בשטר ובמלוה על פה קא מיפלגי

 

After all, it means a debt document against others, and here they differ both on a debt contracted with a document and a debt contracted verbally. 

 

The Talmud resolves that neither case refers to a debt the woman owes him. Rather, case 1 is a loan contracted by document, and case 2 is a loan contracted verbally. 

 

במלוה בשטר במאי פליגי בפלוגתא דרבי ורבנן קמיפלגי דתניא אותיות נקנות במסירה דברי רבי וחכ"א בין שכתב ולא מסר בין שמסר ולא כתב לא קנה עד שיכתוב וימסור מר אית ליה דרבי ומר לית ליה דרבי

 

Concerning a debt contracted with a document, what are they arguing about? They argue about the dispute between Rabbi and the sages. For it was taught: A note is acquired by transfer, the words of Rabbi. But the sages say: Whether he writes [a bill of sale] without delivering [the note itself] or whether he delivers it without writing [a bill of sale], he does not acquire it unless he both writes [a document of sale] and delivers [the original note]. One Master agrees with Rabbi; the other does not agree with Rabbi. 

 

There are now two topics in the baraita—written and verbal debts. The Talmud will first explore the issue of written debts. Why would the sages hold that she is not betrothed when he gives her a debt document, concerning a debt others owe him? The Talmud explains that these sages agree with the rabbis who dispute Rabbi in a baraita about transferring a debt document. Rabbi says that all one must do is simply transfer the debt document. R. Meir would thus agree that one can betroth a woman by simply transferring a debt document to her. The other sages do not agree with Rabbi—and therefore simply giving her a debt document is not sufficient. 

 

ואיבעית אימא דכ"ע לית להו דרבי והכא בדרב פפא קמיפלגי דאמר רב פפא האי מאן דזבין שטרא לחבריה צריך למיכתב ליה קני לך הוא וכל שעבודיה מר אית ליה דרב פפא ומר לית ליה דרב פפא

 

Alternatively, no one accepts Rabbi’s view, but here they differ with regard to R. Papa’s statement, for R. Papa said: When one sells a document to his fellow he must write for him, “Acquire it together with all its obligations”: one Master agrees with R. Papa; the other does not agree with R. Papa. 

 

Perhaps no one agrees with Rabbi that one may transfer a debt document simply by handing it over. The question is what does he have to write in order to transfer it? The tanna kamma of the baraita agrees with R. Papa that he must write “acquire it together with all of its obligations” whereas R. Meir would hold that he need not write this formula.

Note that the Talmud has shifted now to a discussion of transferring debt documents. It does not seem like we’re really talking about betrothal by debt transfer, at least not in particular. 

 

ואיבעית אימא דכולי עלמא אית להו דרב פפא והכא בדשמואל קמיפלגי דאמר שמואל

המוכר שטר חוב לחבירו וחזר ומחלו מחול ואפי’ יורש מוחל דמר אית ליה דשמואל ומר לית ליה דשמואל

 

Alternatively, all agree with R. Papa. But here they differ over Shmuel’s statement. For Shmuel said: If one sells a note of debt to his neighbor and then renounces it [the debt], it is renounced; and even an heir can renounce it. 

One Master agrees with Shmuel; the other does not agree with Shmuel.

 

Shmuel rules that the original creditor can forgive the loan, even after he has transferred the debt. [This rule would seem to make debt transfer impossible, or at least highly risky, and therefore it seems unlikely that any economy could actually abide by this rule.] According to Shmuel’s rule, the one receiving the debt document does not really possess it, because it could always be forgiven. Therefore, the tanna kamma holds, that one may not betroth in this way. R. Meir disagrees with Shmuel and therefore allows one to betroth through transfer of debt.   

 

ואיבעית אימא דכ"ע אית להו דשמואל והכא באשה קמיפלגי מר סבר אשה סמכה דעתה מימר אמרה לא שביק ליה לדידי ומחל ליה לאחריני ומר סבר אשה נמי לא סמכה דעתה

 

Alternatively, all agree with Shmuel, and here they differ in respect to the woman. One Master holds: The woman relies on him, reasoning, he will not leave me [without any benefit] and renounce [the debt] in favor of another; whereas the other Master holds: The woman does not rely on him.

 

Perhaps all tannaim agree that the original creditor can forgive the debt even after he has transferred it. The question is—is the woman concerned that the husband will do so. If she is not worried that he will do so, then she has agreed to betrothal by accepting the document. This would accord with R. Meir. The tanna kamma would hold that she is not confident that he will not do so, and therefore, she has not willingly transferred herself by accepting this form of kiddushin.

Note that the act of accepting betrothal has shifted some here. The question is not—did the woman receive something of absolute value. The question is, does she feel that she has received something of value such that her acceptance of it shows that she is accepting kiddushin. We have shifted from an issue of value, to an issue of, “what was the woman thinking.” This is a shift that I believe we can find in other passages in the Talmud.