Kiddushin, Daf Mem Gimmel, Part 2

 

Introduction

The Talmud continues to discuss why we do not have a paradigm for the law that there can be agency for wrongdoing. In other words, how are we so sure that if one appoints an agent to do something wrong, the agent is liable not the sender.

 

הניחא למ"ד שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין אלא למ"ד מלמדין מאי איכא למימר

 

This works well to the one who holds that two verses that come as one cannot teach [concerning other issues]; but to the one that says they can teach, what is there to say?

 

There is an opinion that holds that one can learn from two verses that come as one. This means that we should have a paradigm that there can be agency for wrongdoing.

 

גלי רחמנא בשחוטי חוץ (ויקרא יז, ד) דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך הוא ולא שלוחו

 

The Torah revealed [the matter] in reference to [sacrifices] slaughtered outside [the Tabernacle]: Blood shall be imputed unto that man: he has shed blood (Leviticus 17:4): that [man , who slaughtered without], but not his agent.

 

The Talmud now cites a source from which we can actually derive the rule that there is no agency for wrongdoing. The issue is slaughtering a sacrifice outside the Temple. The Torah emphasizes unto that man he is liable if he slaughters, but if he appoints an agent to slaughter the animal, he is not liable. The agent is. There is no agency for wrongdoing.

 

אשכחן גבי שחוטי חוץ בכל התורה מנלן דיליף משחוטי חוץ

 

Now, we have found this of [sacrifices] slaughtered outside [the Tabernacle]: how do we know it of the whole Torah? It is derived from [sacrifices] slaughtered outside.

 

The Talmud suggests that sacrifices slaughtered outside the Temple should be a paradigm for all other cases. In all other cases (except for the exceptions we ve discussed so far) there is no agency for wrongdoing.

 

אדיליף משחוטי חוץ ניליף מהנך

הדר כתב רחמנא (ויקרא יז, ד) ונכרת האיש ההוא אם אינו ענין לגופו תנהו ענין לכל התורה כולה

 

Instead of learning from [sacrifices] slaughtered outside, let us learn from these others?

The Torah went back and wrote, And that man shall be cut off: (Leviticus 17:4) since it is irrelevant for its own subject, apply its teaching to the rest of the Torah.

 

The case of sacrifices slaughtered outside can be used as a paradigm and not the other cases where there is agency for wrongdoing (such as trespass or misappropriation) because there is yet another extraneous verse that states that the slaughterer is liable only if he slaughters the animal himself. If he sends an agent, the agent is liable.

 

ולמ"ד שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדים הני ההוא ההוא מאי דריש בהו

חד למעוטי שנים שאוחזים בסכין ושוחטים וחד הוא ולא אנוס הוא ולא שוגג הוא ולא מוטעה

 

But to the one who maintains that two verses that come as one do not teach, these words that man how does he interpret them?

One is to exclude the case of two men who hold the knife and slaughter.

And the other, that [man], but not one who is compelled; that [man], but not one who does so unwittingly; that [man], but not one who does so in error.

 

If one holds that two verses do not teach, then there is no reason we need the midrash on that man to teach that there is no agency for wrongdoing because we now have no paradigms to indicate that there should be. So then what does this position do with that man.

The word appears twice so it can be interpreted twice. The first is to exempt a case where there are two men holding the knife. While they should not slaughter a sacrifice outside the Temple, neither is liable.

The second appearance limits liability to those who did so knowingly and willingly. One who is forced, or one who does so without knowing what he is doing or that it is prohibited is not liable.

ואידך מהוא ההוא ואידך הוא ההוא לא דריש

 

And the other? [He derives it from] hu hahu.

And the other? He does not derive anything from hu hahu.

 

We now enter the typical midrashic chain. How does the position that holds that two verses that come as one do not teach (and thus uses the word hahu to teach that there generally is no agency in wrongdoing) derive the law exempting those who slaughter without full knowledge or will? He derives it from the extra ha. The Torah could have written hu instead of hahu. [Actually the prefix is necessary, but midrashic logic is willing to expand the notion of proper syntax].

The other position does not need to make any midrash on the extra heh because he simply thinks that doing so is ridiculous. Those are my words, not Rashi s.

If you had a little trouble following this last section, I would not worry about it too much. It s pretty complex.