Kiddushin, Daf Mem Bet, Part 6

 

Introduction

Today s section continues to discuss the principle of there is no agent for wrongdoing.

 

והדתניא שליח שלא עשה שליחותו שליח מעל עשה שליחותו בעל הבית מעל

כי עשה שליחותו דבעל הבית בעל הבית מיהא מעל אמאי נימא אין שליח לדבר עבירה

 

Then when we learned: An agent that does not carry out his instructions, the agent is liable for trespass: if he carries out his instructions, the owner is liable for trespass.

In any case, if he carries out the owner s instructions, the owner is liable for trespass. Why? Let us say: There is no agent for wrongdoing.

 

The issue here is trespass illicit use of Temple funds. If one sends out an agent to perform an act of trespass, as long as the agent actually does what he is sent to do, the sender has committed trespass and is liable for it, not the agent. But why, since trespass is a sin, shouldn t we invoke the principle there is no agent for wrongdoing and hold the agent liable.

 

שאני מעילה דילפא חטא חטא מתרומה מה תרומה משוי שליח אף מעילה משוי שליח

 

Trespass is different, because the meaning of sin is derived from terumah: just as an agent can be appointed for [separating] terumah, so one can be appointed in respect of trespass.

 

The laws of trespass are derived from the laws of terumah due to the use of the word sin in both contexts. Therefore, just as one can appoint an agent when it comes to terumah, so too one can appoint an agent when it comes to trespass, despite the rule of there is no agent for wrongdoing.

 

ונילף מינה משום דהוי מעילה ושליחות יד שני כתובים הבאים כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין

 

Then let us learn [a general law] from it?

[We cannot] because trespass and misappropriation are two verses which teach the same thing, and we do not learn from two verses that teach the same thing.

 

Why not use trespass as a paradigm to derive the principle that there is an agent for wrongdoing?

The answer is that there are two cases in which one can appoint an agent for wrongdoing, trespass and misappropriation. And as we learned earlier, if the Torah teaches a principle twice, the principle is not a paradigm. It is restricted to those three cases.

We will now learn what misappropriation refers to.

 

מעילה הא דאמרן שליחות יד מאי היא דתניא (שמות כב, ח) על כל דבר פשע בש"א לחייב על המחשבה כמעשה ובה"א אינו חייב עד שישלח בו יד שנאמר אם לא שלח ידו וגו’

אמרו ב"ש לב"ה והלא נאמר על כל דבר פשע

אמרו להם ב"ה לב"ש והלא נאמר (שמות כב, י) אם לא שלח ידו במלאכת רעהו

אמרו ב"ש לב"ה א"כ על כל דבר פשע למה לי

שיכול אין לי אלא הוא אמר לעבדו ולשלוחו מנין ת"ל על כל דבר פשע

Trespass, as we stated.

Misappropriation what is that? As it was taught: For every matter of trespass (Exodus 22:8): Beth Shammai holds: This is to make liable for intention as for actual deed.

But Beth Hillel says: He is not responsible unless he actually misappropriates it, for it is said, Whether he has not put his hand, etc.

Beth Shammai said to Beth Hillel: But is it not said: For every matter of trespass !

Beth Hillel responded to Beth Shammai: But is it not said: To see whether he has not put his hand to his neighbor s goods?

Beth Shammai said to Beth Hillel: If so, what is the meaning of, for every matter of trespass? [They answered]: For I might think, I know it only of himself [the guardian]; how do I know it if he instructs his slave or agent? Scripture says: For every matter of trespass.

 

Trespass referred to in Exodus 22:8 is a case where a person who was guarding someone else s goods claims that the goods were stolen. He takes an oath that he did not misappropriate the goods for himself. According to Bet Shammai, he is liable even if he thought about taking the goods. Bet Hillel says he is liable only if actually takes the goods. But Bet Hillel hold that he is liable if he sends his agent to misappropriate the goods. Thus, to Bet Hillel, there are two cases where one is liable for sending an agent to do an act of wrongdoing trespass of Temple property and misappropriation of guarded goods. Two cases cannot serve as a paradigm. In all other cases, one is not liable for sending an agent to commit a wrong act.