Kiddushin, Daf Mem Bet, Part 5

 

Introduction

The Talmud now returns to discussing the issue of agency.

 

והא דתנן השולח את הבעירה ביד חרש שוטה וקטן פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים שילח ביד פיקח פיקח חייב ואמאי נימא שלוחו של אדם כמותו

 

Now, that which we taught: He who sends forth a fire by a deaf-mute, one not of sound senses, or a minor, is not liable [for the damage caused] by human law, yet liable by the law of Heaven.

But if he sends it by a person of sound senses, the person of sound senses is [legally] liable. Yet why so? Let us say that one s agent is as himself.

 

If a person sends out a fire with another person and the fire causes damage, the sender is not liable. If he sends it with a person not considered legally responsible, then no one is liable in a human court, although since the sender acted carelessly, he is liable in the heavenly court. But if he sends it with a person considered legally responsible, then the one who carries the fire is liable. But why should this be don t we hold that a person s agent is as himself. Thus the sender should be liable.

 

שאני התם דאין שליח לדבר עבירה דאמרינן דברי הרב ודברי תלמיד דברי מי שומעים

 

There it is different, for there is no agent for wrongdoing, for we say: The words of the master and the words of the pupil, to whom does one listen?

 

There is no agency when one commits a wrongdoing. It may be wrong or careless for me to send someone else out with a dangerous substance which might cause damage, but I am not legally liable if he does so. He should have listened to the words of the master, i.e. God, who would prohibit engaging in damaging activities.