Kiddushin, Daf Mem Aleph, Part 5

 

Introduction

Above the Talmud derived that one can appoint an agent to separate and eventually slaughter the pesah sacrifice. Today s section asks the question that usually follows if we know that one can appoint an agent for sacrifices, then why can t we derive the other cases, marriage, divorce and terumah, from this case?

 

נכתוב רחמנא בקדשים וניתי הנך וניגמרו מיניה

 

Now, let the Torah write [the principle of agency] in respect to sacrifices, and we can bring the others derive them from it?

 

משום דאיכא למפרך מה לקדשים שכן רוב מעשיהן ע"י שליח

 

Because it may be refuted: as for sacrifice, that is because most of their actions are [performed] through an agent.

 

Sacrifices cannot serve as a paradigm for the ability to appoint an agent in other matters because most sacrificial actions are performed through an agent, usually a priest.

 

חדא מחדא לא אתיא תיתי חדא מתרתי

הי תיתי לא נכתוב רחמנא בקדשים ותיתי מהנך

מה להנך שכן ישנן חול אצל קדשים

 

One cannot be derived from another: but let one be derived from two [others]?

Which one should be thus derived? Let the Torah not state it with respect to sacrifices, and we could derive it from these others?

As for these, [it might be argued] that [one may appoint an agent] because they are secular in comparison with sacrifices.

 

We have discussed four issues marriage, divorce, terumah and sacrifices, and stated that the right to appoint an agent cannot be derived from one of them and therefore the Torah had to teach agency in all of them. But maybe we can derive from two of them that agency works in the others? If so, why would the Torah have to teach the efficacy of agency in the others? The Talmud will now test this out.

We could not derive agency in sacrifices from the other cases, because sacrifices are holy whereas the other matters are either not holy at all, or less so. Therefore, the Torah had to teach the efficacy of agency with regard to sacrifices.

 

לא נכתוב רחמנא בגירושין ותיתי מהנך

מה להנך שכן ישנן במחשבה

 

Let the Torah not write it in the case of divorce, and we could derive it from the others:

As for these, that is because they can be performed with intention.

 

We could not derive agency in divorce from agency sacrifices and terumah because sacrifices and terumah can be designated by thought only. This is not true of divorce the man must give the woman a get. It is not sufficient for him to merely think that he wishes to divorce her.