Kiddushin, Daf Lammed Heh, Part 3
Introduction
The Talmud now looks for a source for the obligation of women in all negative commandments.
וכל מצות לא תעשה וכו’
מנהני מילי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב וכן תנא דבי ר’ ישמעאל אמר קרא (במדבר ה, ו) איש או אשה כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל עונשים שבתורה
And all negative commandments etc. From where do we know this?
Rav Judah in the name of Rav, and it was also taught in the School of R. Ishmael, the verse says, A man or woman if they commit any sin that a person commits (Numbers 5:6) the verse equated women and men with regard to all the punishments in the Torah.
One source for the rule that women are obligated in negative commandments is Numbers 5:6 which explicitly mentions both males and females.
דבי רבי אליעזר תנא אמר קרא (שמות כא, א) אשר תשים לפניהם השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל דינים שבתורה
The School of R. Eliezer taught: The verse says, [Now these are the laws] which you shall set before them (Exodus 21:1): The verse equated a woman to a man with regard to all civil laws in the Torah.
The first verse in parshat Mishpatim uses the plural before them. Thus women are obligated in all civil laws.
דבי חזקיה תנא אמר קרא (שמות כא, כט) והמית איש או אשה השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל מיתות שבתורה
The School of Hezekiah taught: The verse said, And it kills a man or woman [the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death] (Exodus 21:29) the verse equated women with men for all death penalties in the Torah.
This verse equates men and women in the case of an animal that kills a human being. In such a case the master must pay a ransom in order to avoid the death penalty.
וצריכא דאי אשמעינן הך קמייתא משום כפרה חס רחמנא עלה אבל דינין אימא איש דבר משא ומתן אין אשה לא
ואי אשמועינן הא משום דחיותה היא אבל כופר אימא איש דבר מצות אין אשה לא
ואי אשמעינן הא משום דאיכא איבוד נשמה חס רחמנא עלה אבל הנך תרתי אימא לא צריכא:
All three are necessary. For if it had taught us only the first, [I would say] that the Torah has mercy because of atonement; but as for civil law, I might argue that it applies only to men, who engage in commerce, but not to women, who do not.
But if it had taught the second case, I might have argued that is because one s livelihood depends on it; but as for ransom, I might argue, it applies only to men, who are subject to mitzvot, but not to women, who are not subject to them.
And if it taught the last one only, I might have argued that the Torah has mercy because of loss of life; but in the first two I might say that it is not so.
Thus they are [all] necessary.
There are three derivations of the general rule the first from a verse about atonement for accidental sins, the second about civil law, and the third about paying a ransom when an animal murders a human being. Why do we need all three?
The first would not be sufficient to teach that women are subject to all civil law because women did not engage in commerce as did men.
The second, about civil law, would not be sufficient to teach that if an animal kills a woman the owner must pay a ransom because women are not obligated in all commandments, as are men. (I know, this is a bit of an ugly one. But I do think it is a faithful representation of what happens when you exempt people from commandments. You might start to think that there life is less worthy than those fully commanded. This seems to be what might have happened to at least one strand of rabbinic thought).
If all we had was the third rule we might have thought that in that case, men and women were equated because it is a matter of life. But in cases of atonement or civil laws, they are not equal. Therefore we need all three derivations to teach that they are equal in all negative commandments.