Kiddushin, Daf Kaf Het, Part 2

 

Introduction

The sugya continues to discuss loan extensions, asking their limits. If person A can make person B take an oath about a financial matter, can he make him take an oath about anything else?

 

עד היכן גלגול שבועה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב דא"ל הישבע לי שאין עבדי אתה

 

How far does the oath extension [go]? Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: [Even] if he demands of him, Swear to me that you are not my slave.

 

The institution of oath extension goes as far as one wants to take it. He can even make him take an oath that he owns him swear that you are not my slave.

ההוא שמותי משמתינן ליה דתניא הקורא לחבירו עבד יהא בנידוי ממזר סופג את הארבעים רשע יורד עמו לחייו

 

But someone who does that is excommunicated! For it was taught: If one calls his neighbor slave, let him be excommunicated; mamzer, he receives forty [lashes]; wicked, he may lose his very livelihood!

 

The problem is that one who gratuitously calls another person a name such as slave or mamzer is punished (by being excommunicated, by being lashed, or by losing his livelihood). How then could we let someone call another person that in a court of law?

 

אלא אמר רבא הישבע לי שלא נמכרת לי בעבד עברי

 

Rather Rava said: [He may demand of him:] Swear to me that you were not sold to me as a Hebrew slave.

 

Rava adjusts the resolution slightly he must swear that he was not sold as a Hebrew slave. Being a Hebrew slave is not so ignominious because it does not affect one s language.

 

האי טענתא מעלייתא היא ממונא אית ליה גביה

But that is a proper claim? He [is claiming that] he owes him money!

 

The problem with this is that saying that someone else is your Hebrew slave is essentially saying that he owes you money. A Hebrew slave is like an indentured servant. This is not a good example, therefore, of an oath being overextended. It is a simple extension of an oath from one issue of money to another.

רבא לטעמיה דאמר רבא עבד עברי גופו קנוי

 

Rava follows his own view. For Rava said: A Hebrew slave belongs bodily [to his master].

 

The Talmud resolves by saying that to Rava this is not simply a monetary claim. To Rava, the master owns the Hebrew slave and therefore this is a further extension of the oath.

 

אי הכי היינו קרקע מהו דתימא קרקע הוא דעבדי אינשי דמזבני בצינעא אם איתא דזבין לית ליה קלא האי אם איתא דזבין קלא אית ליה קמ"ל:

 

If so, it is the equivalent of land? I might have thought, only land is it usual for people to sell secretly: had he sold it, it would not be generally known; but as for this, had he sold himself, it would have been known. Therefore he teaches us [that it is not so].

 

If the slave is owned by the master, then this is the same as land and we have already learned that if one can impose an oath on another over movable property, he can extend it to land. So what new halakhah are we learning here?

The answer is that were it not for this statement, I would have thought that oath extensions work for land, because people sell land secretly. The purpose of the oath is to uncover the truth, truth that would not have been otherwise unknown. So one might need to make the other take an oath over land. But if a person sells himself into slavery, everyone would know that he had done so. Therefore, we would not need to make him take an oath over such a matter. This is why the Talmud says oath extensions can even go this far. Even though it seems very unlikely that B is actually A s Hebrew slave (had this been true we would know of it), A can still make him take an oath that he is not.