Kiddushin, Daf Kaf Gimmel, Part 2

 

Introduction

According to R. Meir, other people can buy a slave s freedom, but the slave himself cannot. Our section explores this opinion.

וקונה את עצמו בכסף כו’: בכסף ע"י אחרים אין אבל לא על ידי עצמו

במאי עסקינן אילימא שלא מדעתו מכדי שמענא ליה לר’ מאיר דאמר חוב הוא לעבד שיצא מיד רבו לחירות ותנינא זכין לאדם שלא בפניו ואין חבין לו אלא בפניו

 

And acquires himself by money etc. . . . by money through the agency of others, but not through his own.

What are the precise circumstances? If we say without his [the slave’s] knowledge, since we know that R. Meir maintains: It is to a slave’s disadvantage to leave his master for freedom; and we learned: They may cause merit to a person in his absence, but they may not cause disadvantage.

 

According to R. Meir, others may buy the slave s freedom they may pay to set him free. So the question is what are the circumstances? The first possibility is that the slave has not consented to be set free. But this should not work for R. Meir holds that it is not to the slave s advantage to go free. And we also know that a person cannot cause disadvantage to another without his consent. Therefore this cannot refer to a case where the slave has not consented to be set free.

 

אלא פשיטא מדעתו והא קמשמע לן על ידי אחרים אין על ידי עצמו לא

אלמא אין קנין לעבד בלא רבו

 

Rather it obviously means with his consent, and it teaches us: only through the agency of others [can he be freed,] but not through his own,

Thus a slave cannot acquire things without his master.

 

Rather, R. Meir must refer to a case where the slave consented to being set free. And nevertheless, he cannot free himself. Others must buy his freedom. Here we learn that a slave cannot acquire any property. As soon as he does, it becomes the property of his master.

 

אי הכי אימא סיפא בשטר על ידי עצמו על ידי עצמו אין על ידי אחרים לא ואי מדעתו על ידי אחרים אמאי לא

 

If so, cite the second clause: by document through his own agency: only through his own agency, but not through that of others.

But if with his consent, why not through the agency of others?

 

R. Meir goes on to say that if he is going free by document, he must accept the document himself. Others cannot accept it on his behalf. But if he is consenting to going free, then why can t others accet a document to set him free?

 

וכי תימא מאי ע"י עצמו אף ע"י עצמו והא קמ"ל דגיטו וידו באים כאחד והא לא תני הכי דתניא בשטר ע"י עצמו ולא ע"י אחרים דברי ר"מ

 

And should you say, what does it mean through his own agency? Even through his own agency, and it teaches us that his document [of emancipation] and his hand [i.e., the right to acquire for himself] come simultaneously. But it was not taught thus! For it was taught: By document through his own agency, but not that of others: the words of R. Meir?

 

The Talmud now introduces a solution that it immediately rejects. We might have thought that a slave can acquire himself through a deed even through his own agency, and not exclusively through his own agency. The innovation here would be that his freedom and his ability to acquire arrive at the same moment, such that at the same moment he is set free, he is also able to acquire the document. The problem is that there is a baraita in which R. Meir explicitly states that a slave acquires himself by document only through his own agency, not if the document is accepted by others.

Thus we now no longer have an acceptable situation for the Mishnah. If the slave did not consent, then why can others set him free by paying for his freedom? And if he did consent, then why can t others accept a document of manumission on his behalf?

 

אמר אביי לעולם שלא מדעתו ושאני כסף הואיל וקני ליה בעל כורחיה מקני ליה בעל כורחיה

 

Abaye said: After all, [it means] without his knowledge. Yet money is different: since he [the master] may acquire him [the slave] against his will, he can free him against his will.

 

Abaye said that the mishnah refers to a case where the slave does not consent. Since a slave can be bought against his will, he can also be sold against his will.

 

אי הכי שטר נמי

האי שטרא לחוד והאי שטרא לחוד

הכא נמי האי כספא לחוד והאי כספא לחוד

טיבעא מיהא חד הוא

If so, the same should apply to the document?

This document is a separate issue and this document is a separate issue

But here too, this money is a separate issue and that money is a separate issue!

The stamp is nevertheless the same.

 

If a slave can be freed against his will through money, then why not also through a document accepted by others? Just as he is bought against his will with a document, so he can also be set free against his will with a document.

The answer is that these are different documents. And if you argue that the money used to acquire him is also different from the money used to purchase his freedom, we can answer that money is money. It is all stamped the same way.

 

רבא אמר כסף קבלת רבו גרמה לו שטר קבלת אחרים גרמה לו:

 

Rava said: In the case of money, its receipt by the master effects it [his liberation]: but as for document, its receipt by others effects it.

 

Rava offers a different reason for why R. Meir holds that a slave can be set free by money given by others but not by a document accepted by others. The slave goes free when his master receives the money. It is not that others are causing him disadvantage. But if the slave goes free by document he goes free when the others accept the document. Therefore, they are causing him detriment, and one may not cause detriment to another without his consent.