Gittin, Daf Yod Daled, Part 2

 

אִיתְּמַר הוֹלֵךְ מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי שֶׁאֲנִי חַיָּיב לוֹ אָמַר רַב חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתוֹ וְאִם בָּא לַחְזוֹר אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתוֹ אִם בָּא לַחְזוֹר חוֹזֵר

 

It was stated: [One who says to another]: Bring this maneh to So-and-so to whom I am obligated: Rav said: He is responsible for it and if he changes his mind, he cannot. And Shmuel said: Since he is obligated for it, if he wants he can change his mind.

 

There are two issues at stake here. The first issue is whether or not the agent, the one delivering the maneh, is responsible for it should he be robbed or something of that nature occur. The second issue is whether or not the sender can change his mind after he gave it to the agent. According to Rav, the sender has responsibility for it even after he gave the maneh to the agent, and yet the sender cannot change his mind once he has given it. According to Shmuel, since the sender is obligated for it, he can change his mind should he decide to retract.

 

לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי דְּמָר סָבַר הוֹלֵךְ כִּזְכִי דָּמֵי וּמָר סָבַר הוֹלֵךְ לָאו כִּזְכִי דָּמֵי

 

Let us suggest that they dispute the following: One master holds that bring is like acquire and the other holds that bring is not like acquire.

 

The first suggestion is that the dispute is over whether when someone says bring he means acquire. If he does, then the sender cannot change his mind after having given over the money. This is how Rav holds. Shmuel would hold that bring is not like acquire and therefore the sender can change his mind.

 

לָא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הוֹלֵךְ כִּזְכִי דָּמֵי וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי מָר סָבַר לָא אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ וּמָר סָבַר אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ

 

No, all hold that bring is like acquire and this is what they are arguing about: One master holds that we do not say migo and the other master holds that we do say migo.

 

The Talmud suggests a different way of understanding the debate. All hold that the agent has acquired the object but they disagree over whether this translates into the loss of original owner s ability to change his mind. Rav holds that it does. He holds that we do invoke the rule of migo which means since . Shmuel holds that in this case since the sender still bears responsibility for the item, he can change his mind up until the recipient receives it.

 

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב הוֹלֵךְ מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי שֶׁאֲנִי חַיָּיב לוֹ תֵּן מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי שֶׁאֲנִי חַיָּיב לוֹ הוֹלֵךְ מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי פִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ בְּיָדִי תֵּן מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי פִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ בְּיָדִי חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתוֹ וְאִם בָּא לַחְזוֹר אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר

 

It was taught in accordance with Rav: [One who says]: Bring a maneh to So-and-so to whom I am obligated or Give a maneh to So-and-so to whom I am obligated or Bring a maneh to So-and-so as a deposit of his that I have in my hands or Give a maneh to So-and-so as a deposit of his that I have in my hands he is liable for the object and if he wants to change his mind, he may not.

 

This baraita accords with Rav. The owner retains liability for the object and nevertheless he may not retract.

 

פִּקָּדוֹן לֵימָא לֵיהּ אֵין רְצוֹנוֹ שֶׁיְּהֵא פִּקְדוֹנוֹ בְּיַד אַחֵר

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא כְּשֶׁהוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן

 

A deposit let him say to him, I don t want my deposit to be with another.

R. Zera says: Where he was presumed to be a denier.

 

The Talmud questions the ruling of the baraita with regard to the deposit. Why can t the sender say to the agent that the owner of the deposit does not want the object to be with another person? This would allow us to view the deposit as being in the hands of the sender, and he could retract.

R. Zera answers that the baraita is in the case where the sender was known to be one who denies having a deposit. The owner would prefer the object therefore to be with the agent than with the sender. And therefore, the sender cannot retract.