Avodah Zarah, Daf Samekh Vav, Part 6
Introduction
Today s sugya contains a very important halakhic debate about whether smell is considered substantial in matters of halakhah.
האי בת תיהא עובד כוכבים בדישראל ש"ד ישראל בדעובד כוכבים אביי אמר אסור רבא אמר מותר
The bung-hole [of a wine-jug]: If an idolater smelled that of an Israelite, it is permitted; but if an Israelite does so with the wine of an idolater Abaye declared it prohibited whereas Rava declared it permitted.
If an idolater smells Jewish wine through a bung hole, the wine is permitted. Such wine was not libated. But a Jew may not, according to Abaye, even smell non-Jewish wine. Smelling is considered deriving benefit and deriving benefit from non-Jewish wine is prohibited.
אביי אמר אסור ריחא מילתא היא רבא אמר מותר ריחא לאו מילתא היא
אמר רבא מנא אמינא לה דריחא ולא כלום הוא דתנן תנור שהסיקו בכמון של תרומה ואפה בו את הפת הפת מותרת לפי שאין טעם כמון אלא ריחא כמון
Abaye declared it prohibited because smell is something substantial, whereas Rav declared it permitted because smell is not something substantial.
Rava said: From where do I say that smell is not considered something substantial? As we have learned: An oven that was lit with cumin that is terumah and they baked bread in it, the bread is permitted because it does not have the taste of cumin but rather the smell of cumin.
Rava says that smell is not something substantial and proves it from a mishnah that deals with lighting an oven with terumah cumin. The bread baked in the oven has the smell of cumin but not the taste and therefore it is permitted for a non-priest to eat it.
ואביי שאני התם דמיקלא איסוריה
Abaye? [What would he say to this argument?] It is different in this instance because the prohibited element was burned.
Abaye, who holds that smell is something substantial, responds that the case of the oven is different, for the prohibited substance is consumed by the fire. In contrast, the wine is still present and therefore a Jew may not smell it.
אמר רב מרי כתנאי הרודה פת חמה ונתנה ע"פ חבית של יין של תרומה ר"מ אוסר ור’ יהודה מתיר רבי יוסי מתיר בשל חיטין ואוסר בשל שעורים מפני שהשעורים שואבות
מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר ריחא מילתא היא ומר סבר ריחא ולא כלום הוא
R. Mari said: This is like [the difference between the following] tannaim: One who removes a warm loaf [from the oven] and places it upon a cask of wine which is terumah, R. Meir prohibits and R. Judah permits it; R. Yose permits if it is of wheat but prohibits if it is of barley because the barley absorbs [the fumes of the wine]. Are they not arguing about the following: One Master regards smell as something substantial and the other regards it as nothing at all?
R. Mari posits that the R. Meir and R. Yose disagree about the same issue that Abaye and Rava do. R. Meir holds that the loaf is prohibited because it absorbs the smell of the wine. Smell is substantial. This is like Abaye. R. Judah permits the loaf because he holds that smell is not substantial. This is like Rava.
לרבא ודאי תנאי היא לאביי מי לימא תנאי היא אמר לך אביי לאו מי איתמר עלה אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר ר"ל בפת חמה וחבית פתוחה דברי הכל אסורה בפת צוננת וחבית מגופה דברי הכל מותרת לא נחלקו אלא בפת חמה וחבית מגופה בפת צוננת וחבית פתוחה והא דידי נמי כפת חמה וחבית פתוחה דמי:
To Rava the tannaim do certainly differ on this matter; but to Abaye are we to say that the Tannaim differ on this matter! Abaye could say to you: Has it not been stated on this source: Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Shimon b. Lakish: In a case of a hot loaf and open cask all agree that it is prohibited; and in the case of a cold loaf and a stoppered cask all agree that it is permitted; they only differ when the loaf is hot and the cask stoppered or when the loaf is cold and the cask open; and the case under consideration is like a hot loaf upon an open cask.
Rava would have to admit that he holds only like R. Judah. But Abaye could say that all tannaim agree with him. They only disagree in a case where the smell is not likely to go into the bread, either because the bread is cold or the wine is stoppered. Abaye could say that smelling the wine directly through the bung-hole is again a case in which all tannaim would agree that the smell is substantial enough for the act to be prohibited.
I think people should note how two issues are being conflated in this sugya. Abaye and Rava are arguing whether one is allowed to smell prohibited substances. The issue is whether an action is permitted. In contrast, the sources they bring are discussing whether substances are defined by their smell or not. The issue is status of object. These are not exactly the same issue. I believe that what causes the sugya to discuss them simultaneously is the general rule smell is substantial or not. This is a classic example of how a general rule allows different subjects to be discussed together and for one to effect the other.