Kiddushin, Daf Samekh Zayin, Part 4

 

Introduction

Today s sugya begins to deal with the next part of the mishnah, referring to a woman who cannot marry this man but can marry others the child of such a union is a mamzer. This refers to incest or adultery.

 

כל שאין לה עליו קידושין

מנא הני מילי דאמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר ר’ יוחנן ומטו בה משום דרבי ינאי ורב אחא בריה דרבא ומטו בה משום רבי יוסי הגלילי אמר קרא (דברים כד, ב) ויצאה מביתו והלכה והיתה לאיש אחר לאחרים ולא לקרובים

 

Whatever [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person:

How do we know this? For R. Hiyya b. Avin said in the name of R. Yohanan, and some said it was on the authority of R. Yannai, while R. Aha son of Rava said that it was on the authority of R. Yose the Galilean: the verse says, And she leaves his house, and she goes to another man (Deuteronomy 24:2) to another man and not to a relative.

 

The rabbis read the second half of Deuteronomy 24:2 as proving that a woman can marry another man meaning one who is not her relative. Otherwise, the verse could have just said man. The word another is the source of the rule that betrothal is ineffective with someone prohibited because of incest.

 

מתקיף לה רבי אבא ואימא לאחר ולא לבן

בן בהדיא כתיב ביה (דברים כג, א) לא יקח איש את אשת אביו אחר למה לי שמע מינה לאחרים ולא לקרובים

 

R. Abba raised a difficulty on this: Yet say: another man but not [her husband s] son?

The son is explicitly written: A man shall not take his father’s wife (Deuteronomry 23:1); what then is the purpose of another [man]. Learn from this to another man , but not to relatives.

 

Why not say that another man excludes marrying her husband s son with him betrothal would be ineffective, but not with other prohibited relations.

The answer is that there is a specific verse that states that a man cannot marry his father s wife. Thus we would not need the word another to teach this. The word another can teach that other incest relations also cannot betroth her.

 

ואימא אידי ואידי לבן הא לכתחילה והא דיעבד לכתחילה

מאחות אשה נפקא ומה אחות אשה בכרת לא תקדש חייבי מיתות בית דין לא כל שכן

 

Yet perhaps both refer to the [husband’s] son, one referring to an ab initio prohibition, the other, to an ex post facto one!

The prohibition ab initio is deduced from a wife’s sister: if one may not betroth a wife’s sister, who is [forbidden by penalty of] karet; how much the more so is this of those on account of whom death by a court is incurred.

 

The Talmud continues to try to say that the word another refers only to the husband s son. Perhaps one verse teaches that she shouldn t be betrothed to him ab initio and the other that if he tries to betroth her, the betrothal is invalid, ex post facto.

But this is rejected because we know the ab initio prohibition by comparing it with the prohibition of marrying one s wife s sister. We know this because it specifically states do not take which is interpreted to mean that marriage does not work. If this is prohibited even though the penalty is only karet, all the more so it is prohibited (and impossible) to marry one s father s wife, for which the penalty is death. Therefore the verse is free to learn that kiddushin is invalid with any incestual prohibition.

 

ואימא אדי ואידי באחות אשה הא לכתחילה הא דיעבד אין הכי נמי

 

Then perhaps both refer to a wife’s sister, one [forbidding it] ab initio, the other, ex post facto! That indeed is so.

 

The Talmud now concedes that both verses could be referring only to a wife s sister. Thus we would know that it is both prohibited ab initio and ex post facto to marry one s wife s sister. This will now need to serve as a paradigm for other prohibited sexual relationships. How do we know that in those cases as well, the kiddushin are invalid. Stay tuned!